University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations

Dissertations and Theses

October 2019

THREE ESSAYS ON FIRM BEHAVIORS IN ONLINE MARKET
PLATFORMS
Erfan Rezvani
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_2
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, and the E-Commerce
Commons

Recommended Citation
Rezvani, Erfan, "THREE ESSAYS ON FIRM BEHAVIORS IN ONLINE MARKET PLATFORMS" (2019). Doctoral
Dissertations. 1756.
https://doi.org/10.7275/15137263 https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_2/1756

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations and Theses at
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

THREE ESSAYS ON FIRM BEHAVIORS IN ONLINE MARKET PLATFORMS

A Dissertation Presented
by
ERFAN REZVANI

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

September 2019

Management

© Copyright by Erfan Rezvani 2019
All Rights Reserved

THREE ESSAYS ON FIRM BEHAVIORS IN ONLINE MARKET PLATFORMS

A Dissertation Presented
by
ERFAN REZVANI

Approved as to style and content by:

____________________________________
Albert Assaf, Co-Chair
____________________________________
Muzzo Uysal, Co-Chair
____________________________________
Christian Rojas, Member

____________________________________
George Milne, PhD. Program Director
Isenberg School of Management

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am grateful to all the people whose support helped toward the completion of this
thesis. I wish to express my gratitude to Dr. Assaf, and Dr. Uysal, my co-advisors, and
Dr. Rojas who have guided and supported me throughout this journey. My special thanks
go also to Dr. Minwoo Lee (University of Houston) and Duane Wilson (Smith Travel
Research) who kindly supported me with the data. Last but not the least, my deepest
gratitude goes to my family. I cannot be thankful enough to my mother and father whose
endless sacrifices and supports made me the person that I am today.

iv

ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON FIRM BEHAVIORS IN ONLINE MARKET PLATFORMS
SEPTEMBER 2019
ERFAN REZVANI
B.S., MAZANDARAN UNIVERISYT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professors Albert Assaf and Muzzo Uysal

Across many online market platforms, customer reviews have become a
prevailing mechanism to evaluate firms and disseminate information about the quality of
their products/services. While prior research has well-documented the impact of such
customer-generated information on firm performance such as sales (e.g. Chevalier &
Mayzlin 2006, Liu, 2006), understanding how firms react to customer evaluations
generates an interesting yet an underexplored topic for research. This dissertation,
through three studies, aims to investigate how customer reviews that are posted on online
platforms shape how firms learn, communicate, and compete.
Chapter 1 shows that learning from own experience follows an inverted U-shaped
curve. This finding indicates that with increase in own experience, firms face lower
customer evaluations in the short-run, but in the long-run they eventually improve their
performance by reducing their customer dissatisfaction. The study also showed that
learning from accumulated experience of similar firms has a U-shaped relationship with
customer evaluation, and that the larger the performance gap, the more motivation

v

organizations have to learn in order to stay on par with their competitors in terms of
performance.

Chapter 2 finds that the proportion of responsive peers (i.e. the extent of peer
pressure) is correlated with a focal firm’s responsiveness to its customer reviews. The
extent of responsiveness, in turn, has a positive impact on customer review ratings.
Moreover, this study finds that firm responsiveness has a weaker effect for branded
(relative to independent) firms. The study also shows that firms with more experience in
providing response to customers may observe a stronger positive effect vis-à-vis less
experienced firms. However, the effect is limited to branded firms which may possess
better capability to learn from their experience.
Chapter 3 shows that, although online reputation (created by online customer
reviews) can partly explain the price competition among firms with similar reputation,
the quality and geographical location have more important effect in determining the
intensity of price competition among firms. This study also finds that price competition is
highly localized with respect to geographical location and quality.
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CHAPTER 1
LEARNING FROM OWN AND OTHERS: THE MODERATING ROLE OF
CUSTOMER-EVALUATED PERFORMANCE GAP1
1.1. Introduction
Learning is fundamental for organizational performance improvement (March,
1991) and survival (Singh et al., 1986; Baum & Ingram, 1998). Research on
organizational learning acknowledges the importance of learning from own experience as
well as the experience of others (e.g. competitors). The relationship between accumulated
experience and performance (e.g. Wright, 1936; Levy, 1965; Adler & Clark, 1991), is
contingent upon the source of learning (own vs. others) and the type of learning outcome
being measured (March, 2010).
Scholars have emphasized that learning through accumulation of own experience
depends on several dimensions such as exposure to different types of experience
(Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002) and the recency of the experience (Argote & Epple,
1990). Learning from the experience of others depends on the clarity and relatedness (i.e.
to our own) of the competitor activities (Ingram & Baum, 1997), among other things.
What affects learning outcomes also depend on the firm’s organizational structure
(Bunderson & Boumgarden, 2010; Fang et al., 2010), social affiliations and networks
(Reagans & McEvily, 2003), as well as other external factors surrounding the firm such

1

Please note that an earlier draft of this chapter was published in the International Journal of Hospitality
Management (Rezvani et al. 2019).

1

as changes in government regulations or technological shifts (Bower & Christensen,
1996).
When assessing whether firms learn through experience, one would also need to
consider the type of performance outcome being measured. While most organizational
learning studies focused on internal measures of performance such as revenue (Mezias et
al., 2002), growth (Greve, 2008), and return on assets (Greve, 2003), organizations are
abstractly recognized and evaluated by relevant actors in markets (DiMaggio & Powell,
1991). Experts, third party intermediaries, and even customers can evaluate the
performance of organizations. In the financial sector, analysts provide recommendations
on stock performance based on their own interpretation of firm performance. In education
sectors, schools’ rankings, provided by third party organizations, may influence financial
performance (Pfeffer & Fong, 2004).
Particular in online markets, customer-generated information acts as a quality
signal and influences the performance of firms across different industries including
lodging (Anderson, 2012), movie (Duan et al., 2008), and books’ sale (Chavalier &
Mayzlin, 2006). As such evaluation mechanisms become prevalent; they can in turn
mobilize organizational resources to conform to what constitutes the acceptable
‘performance’ (DeMaggio & Powell, 1983; Smith, 2011). Similarly, this study argues
that such customer-driven evaluations encourage organizations to learn according to
customer-based performance and improve in order to stay competitive in markets heavily
influenced by such mechanism.

2

Despite the notable importance of learning based on external evaluation, research
addressing organizational learning pattern on external measures is scarce. In fact,
scholars have called for more research to relate experience to such performance measures
(Lapré & Tsikriktsis, 2006; Lapré, 2011). The current study responds to the call and
differentiates from the present literature in two ways. First, it investigates learning
outcomes based on customer dissatisfaction. We also differentiate between two important
sources of learning: learning from own experience and learning from the experience of
others. The first refers to how firms learn from their own experience to reduce customer
dissatisfaction over time, while the latter refers to how firms learn from the experience of
their close competitors to reduce customer dissatisfaction over time.
Second, this study examines the impact of the performance gap between own and
best performing competitors (i.e. performance aspiration) as a motivational factor for
organizational learning. More specifically, this study attempts to answer the following
question: Does the magnitude of performance gap affect the learning outcome from both
own and others’ experience? As customers seek the best value offerings among their
choice sets, organizations in turn may set their point of reference to their best competitors
(Peteraf & Shanley, 1997; Moliterno et al., 2014), compare their own performance with
them, and set aspirations to learn and improve accordingly.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows: Section 1.2 presents the theoretical
framework and the hypotheses. Section 3.1 introduces the empirical study (context, data,
and measurements). Section 1.4 presents the results. Section 1.5 presents the discussion
and conclusions.
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1.2. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
1.2.1. Learning from own experience (experiential learning)
According to the experiential learning theory, performance can improve as firms
accumulate experience over time at a decreasing rate (Dutton & Thomas, 1984). The
theory roots back to the Wright learning curve (Wright, 1936) as the foremost learning
model observed in manufacturing settings in which accumulation of experience was
shown to reduce the cost in an airplane production facility. At the center of the
organizational learning process, there exists learning cycles with inherent feedback and
capability for adaptation (Zangwill & Kantor, 1998). In other words, the necessary
mechanism for experiential learning involves reflection on available feedback following
the experience and the conceptualization of a causality link between experience and the
outcome (March, 2010). As organizational routines can be interpreted as the result of
realization of success of previous actions and continuous adaptation to maximize goals
attainment (Argote, 1999), organizational learning involves an incremental process
within the established routines that create structure for interpretation of action-outcome
(Daft & Weick, 1984).
Many factors related to feedback information can also influence learning. Huber
(1991) argues that experiential learning is enhanced by the increased availability of
accurate feedback on actions and outcomes. External evaluation feedback can be very
abstract, heterogamous in nature and ambiguous. Thus, learning can be impaired from
such feedback information and become negatively related to the accumulation of
operating experience. Learning in complex and dynamic environments with too many
variables make it difficult to conceptualize effective action-outcome causation.
4

Temporal and spatial dis-contiguity between an action or experience and the
outcome makes the learning from feedback prone to errors. Sorenson (2003) showed that
difficulties in direct observation of outcome of actions and interruption and lack of
effective information communication in highly vertically integrated organizations
negatively affect the learning ability. Repenning & Sterman (2002) showed that time
delay between an action and its outcome may lead to erroneous interpretation and
misattribution of an action’s outcome. Starbuck & Milliken (1988) argue that
retrospective account of past actions oversimplifies and erase many casual relationships
between an action and outcome and may not help organizational decision making in
current time by ‘sense-making’ of past events.
Noise and ambiguity in the environment can lead to “superstitious learning” by
learning false lessons by misattributing unrelated consequences to organizational actions
(Argyris & Schön, 1978; Levitt & March, 1988). Ambiguity refers to the presence of
contradictory feedback regarding an action. Zollo & Winter (2002) posit that high level
of perceived ambiguity between actions and outcomes decreases the likelihood of
learning from experience in reaction to a dynamic environment.
In addition, often, feedback is distorted and noisy, not revealing the true
relationship between actions and outcomes that is necessary for an effective learning
(Huber, 1982). According to Levitt & March (1988) and Levinthal & March (1993),
organizational learning is impaired when the perception about action-outcome feedback
is poorly specified and might lead to erroneous learning. Also, March & Olsen (1975)
discussed that individuals create false belief, or “myth”, based on subjective
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interpretation of inaccurate information and transfer of their knowledge within
organizations.
Acknowledging that the ability to draw accurate causation from feedback
information depends on how it is related to current routines which are based on known
casual relationships (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), the process of learning from a dynamic
and complex environment requires a series of cause-effect relationships assessments to
develop a theory (know-why) that explains the experienced events and their performance
implications (Mukherjee et al., 1998). During this search process, the risk of
misattribution and creation of erroneous ‘mid-theories’ may have disruptive impact on
the current performance. Heleblian & Finkelstein (1999) found that heterogeneity
involved in the previous experience and difficulty of developing an effective cause-effect
relationship in the short-run, results in lower performance in organizations.
However, the rate of discovery is enhanced with an increase in search intensity
and richness of information pool (Radner, 1975). In other words, with further
accumulation of experience that are similar in nature, accompanied by increased
likelihood of observing similar feedback, the likelihood of discovering a ‘correct’ theory’
increases. That, in turn, increases the chance of establishing incremental change into
current routines with higher possibility of enhancing performance. Therefore, this study
hypothesizes:
H1: The level of own experience has an inverted U-shaped relationship with
customer dissatisfaction; In the short-run customer dissatisfaction will increase, but as
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firms accumulate further experience in the long-run, customer dissatisfaction will
decrease.
1.2.2. Learning from others’ experience (vicarious learning)
Competitive environment was found to influence the learning outcomes for
organizations. Spence (1981) showed that with increase in market competition with large
number of competitors, the incentive for learning increases for individual firms as source
of competitive advantage, but he posits that in the presence of knowledge spill-over
effect, learning motivation based on own experience decreases. The pursuit of profit
maximization and risk aversion drives organizations to evaluate the cost and benefit
related to a learning process. In that sense, realization of a known causal relationship in
the environment (market) does not justify the cost of learning by self. In fact, Rendell et
al. (2010) showed that, although own experiential learning provides more accurate
information about a task, social learning (vicarious or learning from others) through
observing and exploiting others’ successful strategies has higher pay-off even under the
condition in which experiential learning costs no more than vicarious learning, because of
information filtration benefit associated with highly paid-off strategies. In other words,
social learners can lower the risk associated with trial-error learning and save the cost of
searching for successful strategies according to their own experience (Smith, 1988;
Laland, 2004). Similarly, March (1991) also argued that the existence of obvious pay-offs
from strategies limits organizational effort to explore new ones by themselves.
Empirical evidence on the benefit of vicarious learning for competing firms is
present in the literature. In studying the impact of the sources of experience on learning
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curves for U.S. railroad organizations, Baum & Dahlin (2007) found that in order to
reduce their accident costs, railroad organizations benefit more from the experience of
other similar organizations than from their own experience. Similarly, using time-series
data from 1,135 hotel chains from 1896 to 1985, Ingram & Baum (1997) found that while
own operating experience benefit organizations in the short-run, it had a negative effect
in the long-run because of the overreliance on own knowledge and inertia created through
exploiting current routines. The authors found that industry operation and competitive
experience consistently motivated hotels to succeed.
Cohen & Levinthal (1990) argue that excessive reliance on knowledge acquisition
from others can also be dysfunctional for organizations. To realize its benefits, the
experience from others must be absorbed and integrated into the current organizational
knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Kogut & Zander, 1992). Thus, exploitation of
such external experience is limited to the extent to which an organization can integrate
the knowledge into its own current knowledge. As a result, the benefit of such
exploitation becomes smaller as the need for knowledge integration increases.
Furthermore, a high level of integration introduces a greater level of variability to current
routines (knowledge) and imposes disruption to own knowledge due to the increasing
need to modify the importing experience in accordance to current knowledge (Dodgson,
1993; Kim, 1998). Particularly, due to limited absorptive capacity for external knowledge
acquisition (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), the effective integration of external knowledge
becomes more costly as the amount of available external experience increases.
Therefore, lower levels of accumulated experience from others, due to higher
levels of available absorptive capacity, increases learning ability and provides adaptive
8

benefits. As external knowledge absorption increases, the disruptive effect outweighs the
benefit of adaptation at a higher rate because of decreasing capacity for absorption and
increasing disturbance to the current knowledge. Based on these arguments, this study
hypothesizes the following:
H2: The level of external experience (experience from others) has a U-shaped
relationship with customer dissatisfaction; in the short-run customer dissatisfaction
decreases by exploiting external experience, but in the long-run, further dependence on
external experience has a negative impact on customer dissatisfaction.
1.2.1. Performance gap as a motivational factor for learning
Aspiration-performance feedback plays a motivating role in organizational
learning and change (March & Shapira, 1992; Greve, 2003). As individuals compare
themselves with similar others for the purpose of self-assessment or self-enhancement
(Wood, 1989), in a competitive business context, organizations also form aspiration
levels for performance improvement by comparing their performance relative to that of
similar organizations representing their reference groups (Cyert & March, 1963). Greve
(2003) showed that decision makers’ learning pattern differs with managers’ evaluation
of current performance relative to “aspiration level”. Duncan (1979) posit that persistent
performance gap in performance indicates lack of knowledge and motivates organization
to obtain knowledge through searching/exploring. The extent of performance gap
determines the intensity of search efforts to reduce the gap (March & Simon, 1958).
Resorting to exploratory search for solution involves risk even with higher
expected pay-off than exploitation of own knowledge (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
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Underperformance also decreases the risk tolerance of the investment for exploration
(McNamara & Bromiley, 1997). Similarly, Greve (2003) argues that performing near
aspiration level initiates more local-search and exploitation of the current knowledge
within organization, while larger performance gap triggers non-local and more
exploratory search for new practices (Greve, 2003). In other words, learning from own
experience is deemphasized in favor of exploring and learning from others’ experience
(Baum & Dahlin, 2007).
In addition, as emphasized earlier, utilizing customer feedback to reflect on own
experience requires a continuous course of trial and error. The realization of an actual
pay-off may be uncertain, at least in the short-run. Such uncertainty decreases the
propensity of utilizing such feedback in favor of exploiting current own knowledge, even
with lower pay-offs. That implies that firms benefit from their own experiential learning
with a relatively lower benefit rate of learning. That is because of the longer learning time
required to learn from own experience and also a higher relative value of learning from
the experience of others available within the market. Thus, this study hypothesizes:
H3a: The performance gap flattens (reduces) the inverted U-shaped relationship
between learning from own experience and customer dissatisfaction. In other words, the
negative effect of lower levels of own experience on performance as well as the positive
effect of higher levels of own experience are reduced with an increase in performance
gap.
Similarly, when the performance gap increases, motivation to use experience from
others also increases. That is, a higher gap between own and a competitor’s performance
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may deemphasize the reliance on own experience. In other words, a larger extent of
underperformance (increased performance gap) can lower the resistance to change and
import experience from others as a learning source. While this learning mechanism may
benefit underperforming firms to some extent, firms may incur a higher risk of
successfully implementing the outside experience when they become abundant and the
need for absorbing and integrating the external experience increases. The risk is
attributable to a relative lack of reliance on own knowledge necessary to absorb the
external experience (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Zahra & George, 2002). Accordingly, this
study hypothesizes:
H3b: The performance gap steepens the U-shaped relationship between learning
from the experience of others and customer dissatisfaction. In other words, the negative
effect of lower levels of experience from others on customer dissatisfaction as well as the
positive effect of high levels of experience of others become stronger as the performance
gap increases.

Figure 1 Conceptual Framework
Performance gap

Own experience

H1

H3a
H3b

Experience
from others

H2
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Customer
Dissatisfaction

1.3. Empirical study
1.3.1. Research Context and Data
Figure 1 summarizes the conceptual framework and the hypotheses discussed
above. This study utilizes a single market of hotels to control for the complexity impact
that can affect the knowledge creation within an organization. Hotels are characterized as
rather simple organizations and less knowledge intensive compared to manufacturing or
high-tech organizations. In addition, considering only a single market in a specific
geographical area enables the study to assume that organizations can observe and learn
from their competitors’ practices. Also, geographical proximity can be a facilitating
factor for knowledge spill-over effect. The sample encompasses hotels of different
service quality categories. Categorization of hotels is based on their average room price
level; this is the primary method used by Smith Travel Research, one of the leading
global hotel information providers (Kalnins & Chung, 2004; McCann & Vroom, 2010).
Hotels in the sample include 5 categories from 1 to 5; with 5 indicating the highest
quality (price) level.
This study uses 241,512 online customer reviews from Tripadvisor and their
ratings for 61 hotels in Manhattan, New York within a period of 30 months (From
January 2013 to June 2015). Monthly panel data, for the purpose of this study, is used to
observe the performance of the hotels over time. New York City also represents a very
competitive market for hotels across variety of hotel classes and year-round demand for
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this location. The sample also includes hotels with various sizes as well as both
independent and chain hotels.
This study uses online customer reviews as an external performance measure.
While Greve (2008) discussed that organizations pursue a variety of goals and set
different aspirations that shape their behaviors, previous research on organizational
learning and performance aspiration attend mainly to profitability measures such as
return on assets (Audia et al., 2000; Greve, 2003). Focusing on overall performance
leaves out sufficient explanation regarding sub-goals within organizations (Gavetti et al.,
2012). Only a few studies have included other variables such as accident cost (Baum &
Dahlin, 2007), market share and social status of organizations in a competitive network
(Baum et al., 2005). In the same line, this study also examines a non-financial measure
of performance. It argues that assessing and enhancing performance evaluated through
online media such as Tripadvisor can form an intermediate performance aspiration
because such indicator directly influences potential customers purchase decision and
consequently impact hotel sales (Chen et al., 2004 ; Lu et al. , 2014). Further, social
media such as TripAdvisor involves an open and accessible source of information to
monitor competitors’ performance.
To test the proposed hypotheses, similar to learning curve models, this study
builds a regression model to link the experience variables to the performance variable.

13

Table 1 Description of the main variables
Variable
Performance (DV)
Own Experience (IV)
Experience of Others (IV)
Performance Gap(moderator)

Description
(Number of “terrible” and “poor” rated reviews/ the number of total
reviews received at time t ) * Hotel size
Accumulated number of reviews received at time t-1
Accumulated number of reviews received for hotels within the same
group (the star-level) at time t-1
The difference between own performance and the best rival’s
performance (within the same group) at time t-1

1.3.2. Dependent variable (Performance)
This study measures performance using the degree of customer dissatisfaction
(the proportion of negative reviews (including ‘poor’ and ‘terrible’ ratings) to the total
number of reviews for each hotel during a period of a month)2. Although other reviews
may also contain some negativity and complaining voice, these two specific groups of
review are the most indicative measures of overall customer complaints and
dissatisfaction.
All data were obtained from TripAdvisor, which seems to be an appropriate
choice based on the purpose of this study. Negative reviews represent a genuine source of
information on dissatisfactory performance for hoteliers. Hotel managers can utilize this
information and easily monitor both their own and their competitors’ performance.
1.3.3. Independent variables (Own and Others’ Experience)
The variable experience (both from own and others) is measured by accounting
for cumulative number of total reviews that hotels receive from customers. Since it is
unlikely that customers post multiple reviews on a single hotel stay, the number of posted
2

This measure is adjusted this proportion for the number of hotel rooms.
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reviews on TripAdvisor can be used as a proxy of sale (i.e. number of rooms sold).
Similar operationalization was used in other studies in which hotel reviews were used as
a proxy of sale (Ye et al, 2011; Ye et al., 2009). In the same fashion, this study uses the
accumulation of prior reviews on hotels within the same quality level to measure the
experience from others.
1.3.4. Moderator (Performance gap) and control variables
This study measures the aspiration level (performance gap) as the difference
between a hotel’s own and its best competitor’s performance. Usually, hotels within each
class compete with each other. By monitoring its competitors’ ratings based on customer
reviews, a hotel can compare and consequently realize the possible gap. For the purpose
of the current study, the gap between a hotel’s failure rate and the best performing hotel
within its peer group represents the performance gap measure.
Due to inherent seasonality in the travel industry, this study introduces dummy
variables for four quarters to control for variation in sales. By including dummy variables
for each hotel, the impact of fixed unobserved heterogeneity among hotels was
controlled. This study also controlled for ownership type (chain versus independent
hotels) as a possible factor that may impact the failure rate.
1.3.5. Data Analysis
This study uses panel (cross-sectional time-series) data. As Lant (1992)
mentioned, pooling cross-sectional time-series data creates three estimation problems:
heteroscedasticity, contemporaneous correlation, and autocorrelation. It is expected to
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observe autocorrelation (typical in learning curve studies), cross-sectional correlation
(because data were obtained from hotels within the same geographical market), and
heteroscedasticity (because the variance in the error terms may be related to each specific
hotel). Hence, consistent with the estimation procedure used in Lapré & Tsikriktsis
(2006), all estimations were corrected for panel specific autocorrelation using first-order
autoregressive specification and standard error terms as well as cross-sectional
correlation using the procedure “xtpsce” in STATA.
The three main models (model 1, 4, and 5) were constructed in a step-wise
fashion3. This study first includes control variables in model (1). The second model (4)
includes the main independent variables (both own and others’ experience) with one lag
to account the impact of past experience on the measure of performance. In model (5),
the moderator variable (performance gap) and the interaction terms were added to test
whether performance gap has significant effects on the shape of learning curves based on
both types of experience (from own and others). Hence, Model 5 represents the full
model this study is trying to test.
This study also considered the possibility that the learning curve might be a
function of calendar time as an alternative proxy for the experience variable (Hora &
Klassen, 2013; Lapre et al. 2000). However, the results did not show support for such an
alternative model. Additionally, a two-way fixed effect model was used by including
month dummies (29 dummies for 30 months under study) in model (3) to test for any

While the purpose of the study is based on the simultaneous learning patterns both from own and others’
experience, Models 2 and 3 were built to measure the impact of each experience variable separately.
3
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unobserved time variant variables affecting the learning curve; however, the shapes of
learning curves for both own and experience from others remain unchanged.
1.4. Results
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of all variables including the mean,
standards deviation, and correlations. Table 3 contains the regression results. The results
(Table 3) show that the effect of own experience on customer dissatisfaction is positive
and significant, and the effect of its squared term is negative and significant. Such results
are consistent across Models 3, 4 and 5. These results seem to strongly support
Hypothesis 1 predicting that the accumulation of own experience and customer
dissatisfaction have an inverted U-shaped relationship4. While the effect of experience
from others seem to be inconsistent between Models 2, 4 and 5 , the results should be
based on the full theoretical model (i.e. Model 5) in which a sign of U-shaped
relationship between experience of others and customer dissatisfaction is observed.
However, this study cannot fully claim a U-shaped relationship within the range of data
(see footnote 3).
Table 2 Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations

1
2
3
4

variables

Mean

S.D.

1

2

3

4

Failure rate
Own Experience
Experience from Others
Performance gap

45.83
583.53
8231.69
0.09

117.45
590.65
7970.06
0.13

1
0.25
-0.04
0.44

1
0.70
-0.07

1
-0.21

1

4

This study also tested for both inverted and U-shaped relationships using the three steps approach as
recommended by Haans et al. (2016). The turning point for the inverted U-shape is well within the data
range and the slopes at the low and high end of the X-range are also significant. The results however failed
to completely support the full U-shaped relationship between the experience from others and customer
dissatisfaction.
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Hypothesis 3a predicts that with an increase in performance gap, the inverted Ushaped relationship between customer dissatisfaction and own experience will be
reduced. In Model 5 (Table 3), the coefficient of the interaction between own experience
and performance gap is negative and non-significant. Also, the interaction between
performance gap and the squared term of “experience from others” is not significant.
Thus, the moderating effect of performance gap on the effect of own experience on
customer dissatisfaction is not supported. However, Hypothesis 3b predicting the
moderating effect of the performance gap on learning from others is supported. The
interaction of performance gap and the squared term of the “experience from others” is
positive and significant indicating that the relationship is moderated by the performance
gap. However, given that the results did not fully support a U-shaped relationship, this
study cannot fully support a flattening moderation here.
Table 3 The effects of own and others experience on learning
Models
Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

Constant

-34.895***
(9.565)

11.356***
(2.150)

10.764***
(2.444)

11.304***
(2.518)

11.111***
(2.668)

-5.077**
(2.170)
-0.607
(2.201)
-2.160
(2.365)
49.775***
(9.383)

-3.956**
(1.879)
-0.172
(1.857)
-1.477
(1.974)
48.117***
(8.164)

-2.613
(2.206)
1.147
(2.213)
-1.083
(2.312)
46.715***
(8.321)

-3.421∗
(2.017)
0.083
(2.032)
-1.447
(2.101)
29.553***
(4.942)

-3.331
(2.031)
0.123
(2.059)
-1.538
(2.113)
30.054***
(4.591)

134.632***
(12.122)
37.510***
(9.415)
37.260**
(9.436)

-56.489***
(7.981)
-7.971
(11.625)
-8.866**
(2.601)

-52.697***
(8.578)
-0.501
(11.338)
-7.043**
(2.679)

-34.583***
(5.655)
17.215*
(8.682)
-11.851***
(2.731)

-35.042***
(5.340)
17.831*
(8.294)
-11.708***
(2.756)

(4)

(5)

Controls
Season 1
Season 2
Season 3
Chain affiliation

Quality level 3
Quality level 4
Quality level 5
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Predictors
15.563
(14.296)

9.842
(14.206)

9.597
(14.295)

1.555
(14.929)

Own Experience
(lag)

0.010***
(0.002)

0.020***
(0.005)

0.019**
(0.005)

Own Experience2
(lag)

-1.2×10−5 *
(5.7×10−6 )

Performance Gap
(lag)

Experience from
Others (lag)
Experience from Others2
(lag)

3.9×10−4 **
*
(1.1×10−4 )
-5.0×10−9
(1.6×10−8 )

-1.8×10−5 **
(6.9×10−6 )

-1.8×10−5 **
(6.9×10−6 )

-7.1×10−4 *
(2.7×10−4 )

-6.5×10−4 *
(2.7×10−4 )

6.0×10−8 **
(2.0×10−8 )

6.3×10−8 **
(1.9×10−8 )

Interactions
Own experience
(lag) X
performance gap
(lag)

-0.141
(0.135)

Own Experience2 (
lag)X performance
gap (lag)

9.0×10−6
(1.2×10−4 )

Experience from
Others (lag) X
performance gap
(lag)

0.008
(0.005)

Experience from Others2
(lag)X
performance gap
(lag)

5.33×10−7 "
(3.0×10−7 )

Hotels fixed effect

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

Wald χ2

1.2×106

1.2×107

2.3×106

1.1×106

2.6×106

R2

0.73

0.75

0.77

0.78

0.79

N×T

1529

1478

1478

1478

1478

Note: Dependent variable: Failure rate. Panel corrected standard errors are included in the parentheses.
‘***’ P<0.001; ‘**’ P<0.01; ‘*’P< 0.05; ‘"’P< 0.1

19

1.5. Discussions and Contributions
Following the calls by Argote (1999) and Lapre & Tsikriktsis (2006) for further
research on organizational learning curve with focus of market generated measures,
findings of this study contribute to the current literature on organization learning by
including online customer evaluation generated through customer reviews of firms (and
products/services) as an outcome of organizational learning. This study is also motivated
by the practical importance of examining the learning behavior for service firms. Unlike
most research on organizational learning traditionally focused on manufacturing context,
this study focuses on customer feedback as a performance measure for service firms due
to well-documented impacts on bottom-line performance of such firms. According to
Levinthal & March (1993), firms may increase their reliability (reducing variability in
their performance) by repeating certain tasks and accumulating their operating
experience; however, reliability alone does not guarantee success for firms in competitive
markets. Also, as needs and expectations change rapidly, hotel managers should be
sensitive to the voice of their customers and their feedback generated through online
platforms. Therefore, the role of experience in learning needs to be re-examined.
Within this context, this study hypothesized and found evidence for two learning
patterns: learning form own and others’ experience. First, the results showed that learning
from own experience follows an inverted U-shaped curve. This finding indicates that
with increase in own experience, organizations face higher customer dissatisfaction in the
short-run, but in the long-run they eventually improve their performance by reducing
their customer dissatisfaction. This finding contradicts the study conducted on US
airlines, in which the authors found a U-shaped learning curve for airline customer
20

dissatisfaction (Lapré & Tsikriktsis, 2006). One possible explanation is that, unlike
airlines, hotel businesses may involve more customer interactions and receive various
types of complaints, which may prove not to be easily interpretable. Hence, the learning
part (improvement phase) of the curve may occur with some time lag. This study
accounts for a possible mechanism responsible for such pattern in learning: as firms
begin a process of learning from customer feedback, noisy, untimely, and unclear
customer reviews may lead to erroneous learning in the short-run; however, the long-run
outcome may become positive as firm accumulate further experience to apply ‘correct’
actions in order to improve customer satisfaction.
Second, this study showed that learning from accumulated experience of similar
organizations may have a U-shaped relationship with customer dissatisfaction. The
current study accounts for two possible mechanisms that may explain such curvilinear
relationships in learning from other competitors in the market. First, firms may benefit
from adaptation to the market (i.e. experience from others) by utilizing current successful
practices. However, organizations usually manifest limited ability to absorb external
experience which is needed to apply and integrate such experience into their own
organization (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). Second, a disruptive mechanism dominates such
beneficial learning. With further increases in external experience (i.e. experience from
others) and dominantly resorting to it as a source of learning, both the interpretability and
ability to integrate the external experience into a firm’s own knowledge will be impaired
(Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Zollo & Singh, 2004). In addition, external experience
becomes a dysfunctional learning practice which interferes with current knowledge
within an organization.
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As previous research suggests, both internal and external contextual factors can
have impact on learning. In fact, Argote & Miron-Spektor (2011) called for research on
the impact of contextual elements moderating organizational learning. This study is of the
few that combine a contextual factor, in this case performance gap relative to the best
competitor, with two types of experience in studying organizational learning curves.
Many studies have shed light on the impact of customer evaluations on firm performance
(e.g. Chavalier & Mayzlin, 2006; Duan et al., 2008; Anderson, 2012), however, the
motivational impact for gaining favorable customer evaluations on learning patterns has
not received enough attention in the literature.
This study found potential evidence of the existence of a motivational factor for
learning in a competitive market. The magnitude of the performance gap shows both
advantages and disadvantages of learning from similar organizations. In other words, the
larger the gap, the more motivation organizations have to stay on par with their
competitors in terms of performance. This conjecture is consistent with findings from the
study of learning behavior in railroad companies (Baum & Dahlin, 2007). The authors
found that companies tend to rely on the experience of similar firms when their
performance is well below other companies.
However, the hypothesis predicting the moderating effect of performance gap on
own experiential learning did not confirm that larger performance gap generates more
motivation to learn from own experience. Social comparison at the inter-organizational
level may influence the learning orientation in terms of cost-benefit evaluation for
different sources of learning. Therefore, the impact of larger gap, in this case, does not
seem to be systematically encouraging the learning process within organizations. A
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possible explanation for such result may be that learning from own experience may be
more of an internal process driven by organizational factors that systematically facilitate
the knowledge interpretation and integration within an organization. Learning based on
customer feedback may represent an unsystematic process that requires a built-in process
of interpretation, internationalization, and implementation of knowledge throughout an
organization (Crossan et al., 1999). Building such a required process may in turn need
internal motivational factors such as a reward system for knowledge sharing (Bartol &
Sirivastva, 2002) and motivational leadership to stimulate internal learning (Vera &
Corssan, 2004).
According to Levinthal & March (1993), firms may increase their reliability
(reducing variability in their performance) by repeating certain tasks and accumulating
experience; however, reliability alone does not guarantee success for firms in competitive
markets. Customers’ needs and expectations change rapidly, and hotel managers should
be sensitive to the voice of their customers. Therefore, the role of experience in learning
needs to be reexamined. This study suggests that organizations that face fierce
competition with low experience may enjoy more benefits by utilizing the experience
from others and knowledge available in their competitive market instead of learning to
improve on their own through a trial-error processes. However, over-reliance on the
experience of others may inhibit organizations from building their own competencies,
which in the long-term may jeopardize their performance due to a lack of reliance on
embedded knowledge in their organizations.
Practically speaking, hotels need to rely on their own experience as a source of
learning for long-term benefits. That is because hotels may have more control over their
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own learning experience and know-how over time and use that accumulated own
experience as an asset to differentiate themselves from others. In other words, although,
learning from others could direct hotels to meet critical performance factors in order to be
competitive, it may not give hotels enough differentiation leverage to sustain their
performance over time.
To this end, turning what is learned from the complex environment into an asset
of operant resources reflective of customer feedback may require the establishment of a
series of cause-effect relationships between the internal and external firm environments.
Therefore, hotels own operand resources could be augmented through what is also
learned from others to propel performance. There is no question that hotel performance is
influenced by environmental factors from their competitive sets as well as their own prior
experience. The challenge is then how to configure the use of such resources as input-tooutcome performance measures. Because it is clear that customer-driven evaluations may
encourage organizations to learn how to stay competitive in the market place, it is equally
imperative that hotels know how to utilize both their own operand resources and what
they have gained from outside as an operant to reduce customer dissatisfaction over time.
This study acknowledges several limitations. First, the research framework is
limited to only one external firm evaluation criterion. Using more diverse ways to
externally evaluate organizations may help generalize the findings. For instance,
analyzing the differences in terms of media rankings can be one way to conceptualize the
organizational competitive position. Second, this study used a sample of a limited number
of hotels in one specific location. This may affect the generalizability of the findings.
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Using a larger sample from different markets and competitive levels may depict different
learning patterns.
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CHAPTER 2
FIRM RESPONSIVENESS TO CUSTOMERS: A PEER-INDUCED BEHAVIOR
AND THE IMPACT ON CUSTOMER REVIEWS
2.1. Introduction
Information disclosure on products/services’ quality may act to reduce
information asymmetry within markets. Such information may partly originate from
stakeholders’ (e.g. customers, government/rating agencies) evaluation of firms’ products.
Past research shows that firms under evaluation may react according to what their
stakeholders demand. Among others, firms may improve their product quality (e.g. Jin &
Leslie, 2003; Martins, 2005; Fishman & Levy, 2015) or provide a public response to their
stakeholders following product quality defaults (Elsbach, 1994, Wang et al. 2016).
Online markets such as eBay, Amazon, and TripAdvisor are prominent contexts
in which such information disclosure has been substantially facilitated. These platforms
enable customers to post reviews on products/services and allow firms/sellers to
voluntarily respond to customer reviews5. Even though the credibility of individual
customer reviews are not verifiable by the audience, the positive impact of aggregated
online customer reviews in revealing quality information and improving customer
decision making has been well documented in previous research6. However, the question
remains whether and under what conditions firm response to customer reviews can also
be a channel for revealing information about firm/product quality? In other words, this
5

For instance, firms may offer apologies, promise to improve, offer compensation to dis-satisfied
customers, or even respond to reviews to clarify their product/service quality level expectations for future
customers.
6
See for example Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006, Lewis and Zervas, 2016.
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study seeks to first answer whether a firm’s public response affects its customer reviews,
indicating whether customers can make better decisions by using such information.
Second, we assess how the strength of this relationship varies depending on firms’ level
of available quality signal (particularly among branded and independent firms). Finally, if
firms’ responsiveness increases customer review ratings, does experience in responding
play a role in the effectiveness of firms’ responses?
To answer these questions, this study builds on initial research findings showing
that firm response may affect customer reviews. Some research shows that firm response
to customer reviews leads to improvement in subsequent reviews in online market
platforms (Fradkin et al., 2015; Proserpio & Zervas, 2017). Others, however, found that
firms’ response can have a limited or even negative impact on customer reviews (Gu &
Ye, 2014; Chevalier et al. 2018; Ma et al., 2015). Past research mainly attributes firm
response as a reaction to individual reviews threatening firms’ reputation or image7.
Nonetheless, it is common that firms respond to non-negative reviews as well. Therefore,
this study seeks to examine an antecedence of overall responsive behavior among firms
and measures its impact on customer reviews.
To do so, this study first argues that responsiveness is driven by competitive peer
pressure and becomes a widespread practice among firms. That is, as more peer firms
engage in responding to their reviews within a market, responsiveness develops as an
expected behavior that ultimately enhances information about quality of
products/services and customer choice making. Second, because the impact of

7

This in turn generates endogeneity (in form of reverse causality) concern in singling out the effect of firm
response on customer review ratings.
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responsiveness depends on the extent to which customers rely on firm response to
develop expectations about a product/service quality, this study argues that response from
branded firms has less influence on their customer reviews. Third, as responding to
reviews becomes a continuous practice for firms, the role of experience in responding to
customer reviews becomes pronounced as ‘experienced firms’ can craft better response to
their reviews to enhance their customer reviews .
This study offers a number of contributions to the literature. First, the study shifts
from the direct influence of public evaluations on firm reactions to its indirect impact on
the initiation of a responsive behavior and enforcing information revelation within a
market. In other words, online markets not only hold firms accountable to customers, but
may also reduce adverse selection for potential customers. In addition, this study shows
that the effect is different for branded firms due to their relative informational advantage
over independent firms, an observation that may reconcile inconsistent previous research
findings. Further, by including the role of experience, this study synthesizes learning
theory with firm public communication practices and provides some primary evidence
that the outcome of responsiveness may be dependent on firm experience.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the related
literature. Section 2.3 introduces the theoretical arguments and hypotheses. Section 2.4
describes the empirical study. Section 2.5 discusses the findings, and Section 2.6 provides
some discussion and concluding remarks.

28

2.2. Related Literature
Previous studies showed that “review posting behavior” on online platforms is
affected by customers’ motivations such as punishing firms, self and/other enhancement
(Hening-Thurau et al., 2004; Wu & Huberman, 2008; Cheung, 2012; Toubia & Stephen
2013; Chevalier et al., 2018). Based on the assumption that the presence of a response is
perceived as a signal of firm attention to customers’ feedback, a number of studies offer
alternative yet inconsistent explanations on why firm response may lead to different
outcomes in customer reviews. In the context of the hotel industry, Proserpio & Zervas
(2017) found that responding to negative reviews increases the overall review ratings
because of the higher cost of writing low-quality and short negative reviews. Wang &
Chaudhry (2018) found that efforts in tailoring responses to negative reviews adds value
and reduces the severity in subsequent negative reviews. Ma et al. (2015), on the other
hand, show that a firm’s response to reviews on Twitter may encourage more negative
reviews through activating ‘redress-seeking’ motivation in others. Consistently, Chevalier
et al. (2018) found that when a hotel manager responds to negative reviews when such
action is observed by others, customers with negative experience are encouraged to write
more “response-seeking” reviews. The authors also show that response to positive
reviews may seem like “promotional” efforts by hoteliers and result in a decline in
reviews’ ratings.
Although previous studies directly link firm response to individual customer
reviews valence, this study instead argues that firm response can provide extra
information about products and services that enhance customers’ decision making and
their reviews. That is, if customer reviews, although they may be biased, are a helpful
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source of information, firms’ response can also create an additional source of information
for customers. In addition, it is not clear from previous research whether if firms
experience a negative consequence from responding to customer reviews, why they
remain responsive to reviews? In the following section, this study develops theoretical
arguments that provide a potential explanation for the existence and dissemination of
responsive behavior within a market. Then, this study sets forward a hypothesis that
argues that the outcome of such behavior may be positive in a way that increases the
customer rating.
2.3.Theoretical Arguments and Hypotheses Development
2.3.1. Mechanism of Firm Responsiveness
Prior scholarship in the management literature traditionally relates firm
responsive communication to the impact of legitimacy-threatening information disclosed
by the media (Pfarrer et al., 2008; Yu et al., 2008), third-party evaluation (Martins, 2005)
and customers’ reviews (Wang et al., 2016). To deal with negative information disclosure
from stakeholders, firms may enact "explanations, rationalizations, and legitimation for
activities undertaken in the organization" which may affect their image in the audiences’
mind (Pfeffer, 1981, p. 4); or they may resort to excuses or justifications to protect their
reputation following negative news (Bettman & Weitz, 1983; Staw et al., 1983).
Unlike traditional news media or periodic third-party evaluations, many online
platforms provide opportunities for customers to constantly evaluate firms as well as for
firms to respond. Firms have the opportunity to have an active role in communication
with the customers in public domains even when their reputation is not threatened. In this
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context, as firms develop an incentive to be seen as accountable and committed to
customers (e.g. Gu & Ye, 2014; Proserpio & Zervas, 2017; Chevalier et al., 2018; Wang
& Chaudhry, 2018), they may resort to response strategy. According to the institutional
theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1987), being subject to customer reviews and the
opportunity to communicate with reviewers generates a setting in which responding
becomes an expected social norm. As more firms engage in such behavior, customers’
expectation to observe responses becomes stronger. Such social norms and expectations
create increased pressure for firms to take ‘conforming’ actions to remain legitimate
within their field (Suchman, 1995).
DiMaggio & Powell (1983) introduced three mechanisms through which social
(institutional) pressures can be generated and lead to dissemination of isomorphic
behaviors among firms: mimetic, normative, and coercive. Uncertainty regarding
organizational technologies, ambiguity in goals, and environments can create a pressure
to mimic behavior. Adopting certain actions and practices by others (peers) gives the
impression of legitimacy and leads to mimicry (Hirsch, 1986; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983).
Mimetic behaviors under uncertain conditions provide a social proof (Briscoe & Safford,
2008) by observing similar organizations displaying ‘successful’ forms of actions
(Spender, 1989) such as governance structure (Shipilov et al., 2010), grievance
procedures (Sutton et al., 1994), multidivisional structures (Fligstein, 2000), and
management practices (Delmas & Toffel, 2008).
Normative pressure is generated by active effort of members of an occupation
through disseminating conditions and methods of recommended actions through
professional channels (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Normative pressure may lead to
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isomorphic conformance to expectations such as conducting expected socialization
behaviors, language, and dressing style by an organization’s members (Cicourel, 1970;
Williamson et al., 1975).
Coercive mechanism for conformance “results from both formal and informal
pressure exerted on organizations by other organizations upon which they are dependent
and by cultural expectations in the society within which organizations function”
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 150). That is, institutional pressures may not only result
from legal forces but also from voluntary diffusion of practices within institutional fields.
For instance, Tolbert & Zucker (1983) found that the adoption of civil service policies
and programs depended on how widespread the policies and programs became within the
institutional environment. Level of diffusion of norms and practices generates
commensurate levels of pressure that compel organizations to conform. Consistent with
these finding, this study proposes the following hypothesis:
H1: The number of peer firms responsive to customers’ evaluation is positively
related to a firm’s responsiveness.
2.3.2. Effect of Firm Responsiveness
As discussed above, firms may be forced to become responsive to customer
reviews as responding becomes an expected behavior. However, the impact of
responsiveness depends on the perception (belief) of the audience (reviewers and
observers) about the firms’ intention (e.g. promising better quality in their responses) and
their real action (e.g. actual quality provision). Because observers cannot directly verify
firms’ action without becoming customers, only credulous observers rely on firms’
32

intention to form their belief about their actions8 (Battaglini & Makarov, 2014; Rand, et
al., 2015). Moreover, such observers may naively develop positive beliefs about a
responsive firm compared to others without such responses (Luca & Smith, 2015); they
may be more likely to become future customers and consequently write reviews9.
However, their belief about a responsive firm may be “corrected” contingent upon an
actual experience that gauges the firm’s ‘truthfulness’ (consistency between firm’s
intention and action). That is, firm responsiveness is seen as a “lie” to customers with
actual inconsistent experiences and stimulates more negativity in their reviews. In other
words, reviewers with motivation to help others or punish a firm may become more
critical and detailed in expressing their opinion by observing firm responsiveness (Ma et
al., 2015; Chevalier et al., 201810) such than they may damage a firm’s reputation.
In a competitive market, due to the value(cost) of building(damaging) reputation
through receiving (un)favorable customer reviews, the “enforced” responsiveness can act
as a disciplinary mechanism driven jointly by potential customer reviews and
competitors11,12. That is, as firms realize the negative impact of “untruthful” responses on
their customer ratings, they are encouraged to reduce the inconsistency between their
intention and actions either by improving their services/products or providing informative

8 If a firm’s actions are not verifiable, ‘rational’ audience may perceive consistent responsiveness by the
firm as “cheap talk” and ignore its message completely. For a review on cheap talk, see Crawford and
Sobel (1982).
9 This is consistent with findings from an experiment in which some eBay buyers paid premium price to
sellers with unverifiable claims of providing high quality products (Jin & Kato, 2006).
10
According to the authors the presence of response does not necessarily increase the reviewers’
motivation to write more positive and impactful reviews
11
Similar kind of disciplinary mechanisms have been found in previous research (e.g. Fournier, 1999; Fang
& Yasuda, 2009, Bakos & Dellarocas, 2011). For a discussion on such mechanisms see MacLeod (2007)
12
This study acknowledges that, in fact, low quality firms may be able to build a good reputation (high
ratings) by posting ‘fake positive reviews’ for themselves; however, the possibility of negative reviews
from future customers who experienced the actual quality can correct such fake reputation if the actual
quality does not live up to the displayed ‘good reputation’.
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responses that help customers to form ‘realistic’ expectations about their quality. That is,
firms that are mediocre or low quality may not claim high quality in their responses13.
However, within market firms may have different levels of available signals of
quality and, therefore, they may experience varying impacts from customer reviews.
Particularly, brands represent credible signals for consistent and pre-determined quality
(Aaker, 1995). Thus, they may reduce customers’ reliance on reviews and firm response
in their decision making. Hollenbeck (2018) shows that customer reviews have a stronger
effect on independent hotels’ sales compared to that of chain hotels. A similar result was
also found in the restaurant industry by Luca (2016). The author shows that independent
restaurants experience stronger effects on demand from customer reviews. Hence,
independent firms (compared to branded firms) may show a higher incentive to improve
quality and/or reveal information about current quality in their responses. In either case,
for independent firms, a relatively higher benefit (cost) of building (damaging) their
reputation (as a signal to quality) may inhibit untruthful responses to reviews. In line with
the presented arguments, this study puts forward the following hypothesis:
H2: Firm responsiveness has a positive impact on customer reviews in a market
with peer-induced pressure to respond. In addition, the effect is stronger for independent
(non-branded) firms.
2.3.3. The Role of Experience
As firms respond to reviews, they may internalize the consequences and learn
over time to develop ‘better’ responses that help customers to make more informed
13

A similar argument is extended previously by Clemons et al. (2006)
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decisions. Because responding to various reviews may be perceived differently by the
audience, responding becomes a sophisticated strategic choice for firms. For example,
firms may realize that crafting more customized (Wang & Chaudhry, 2018) or detailed
responses (Chevalier et al., 2018) to negative reviews positively influences future
reviewers and decreases the number of negative reviews (Proserpio & Zervas, 2017).
Consistent with the proposition by Battaglini & Makarov (2014), firms may also use
informative public communications in cases of less severe reviews.
In any case, through a trial-error process, experience provides firms with a
repertoire of ‘response-outcome’ knowledge to provide informative responses to either
manage future expectations or indicate quality improvement. Learning through the
experience of responding to negative reviews can occur to avoid undesirable
consequences of responding (e.g. overpromising, redress-seeking and customer churn).
Therefore, this study suggests that a firm’s experience in responding to negative reviews
may enhance the impact of response on customer reviews.
H3: Experience in responding to negative reviews positively moderates the impact
of a firm’s responsiveness on its customer reviews.
2.4. Empirical study
2.4.1. Research context
This study tests the hypotheses in the context of online market platforms which
have become an influential source of pre-purchase information (Opinion Research Corp.
2014)14. It is well-evidenced in prior research that online reviews have significant impact

14

For instance, 82% of consumers use online information prior to making purchase decisions.
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on potential customers’ purchase decisions (Gretzel & Yoo, 2008; Anderson, 2012). This
study uses TripAdvisor as the context for this study15. TripAdvisor, founded in 2000, is
now the largest online community, receiving 380 million monthly visits on average and
has over 435 million customers’ reviews and postings for more than 1.1 million hotels,
B&Bs, and specialty lodging facilities in 48 markets worldwide. TripAdvisor manages
and operates 24 other travel media websites around the world and provides access to
online travel agency sites such as Expedia, Travelocity, hotels.com, and booking.com
(TripAdvisor, 2016) to facilitate the booking procedure for customers. Along with
providing the users with online reviews on all listed hotels and facilities, the platform
also provides a forum for all hoteliers being reviewed by customers to publicly respond to
their reviewers. Such responses have a lasting effect as they are permanently available for
future users to access. One advantage of using TripAdvisor is that customers
autonomously can review any firms on the platform. Therefore, using reviewed hotels
reduces the potential selection bias in the analysis.
Initially, this study collected more than 520,000 online customer reviews on 437
hotels in Manhattan, New York City from 2001 to 2015. This time span allows us to
examine the social interactions between hotels and reviewers over time. TripAdvisor
reviews include the reviews’ date, textual content, and whether hoteliers responded to the
reviews or not. This study used Breens’ algorithm to calculate the sentiment scores of the
reviews’ texts such that reviews with scores below zero indicate negative valence and
positive scores represent positive valence (Breen, 2012).

15

Online customer reviews and hotel responses from TripAdvisor have been used by previous researchers
(see e.g. Chevalier et al. 2018; Wang & Chaudhry, 2018)
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The sample includes all hotels reviewed within the TripAdvisor platform. The
hotels range from 2- to 5-star hotels (based on TripAdvisor classification) with different
types of ownership (chain and independent). Information on other characteristics
including price levels and size of hotels was also collected from booking.com.
Some of the hotels were removed from the primary data sample. The decision for
exclusion was based on hotel closure and lack of sufficient data points for estimation of
desired coefficients. The dataset (unbalanced panel) ranges from the first quarter of 2006
to the first quarter of 2015 and includes 350 hotels of which 49% were independent
hotels. Distribution of hotel classes are: 0.35% 1-star hotels, 4% 2-star hotels, 1.5% 2.5star hotels, 22% 3-star hotels, 13% 3.5-star hotels, 13% 3.5-star hotels, 36% 4-star hotels,
12% 4.5-star hotels, and 9% 5-star hotels.
All hotels are located in Manhattan, NYC, one of the most attractive locations for
international and local travelers with different preferences. Manhattan is a highly dense
and competitive market andhas been used in a number of related studies in the past (e.g.
Baum & Mezias, 1992; Baum & Lant, 2003), and includes hotels of various classes and
categories. For this reason, it represents an excellent context to test this study’s
hypotheses. The hotels are sampled from different districts in Manhattan to account for
possible impact of relative attractiveness of the hotels on their responding behaviors.
2.4.2. Dependent variable
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The dependent variable in this study is the measure of customer review ratings16.
As mentioned previously, this study collected all reviews targeting all hotels in the
sample. TripAdvisor allows the reviewers to rate hotels from 1 to 5. The quarterly
average of review ratings of all hotels was computed to analyze the change in ratings
over time while controlling for time (year) effects that may influence the trajectory of
review ratings17.
2.4.3. Independent variables
To test hypothesis 1 (H1), this study uses the ratio of responsive hotels within
each hotel class (star-level provided by TripAdvisor platform) as a proxy measure of
competitive pressure that triggers focal hotel responsiveness. Since hotels with the same
star-level normally provide similar levels of amenities and services, this study adopts this
criterion to define reasonable competitive groups. In other words, hotels within the same
class may compete for similar demand or customers. Finding support of this hypothesis
allows the study to proceed to testing the second hypothesis.
To test hypothesis 2 (H2), this study measures hotel responsiveness by dividing
the number of responses by the total number of reviews received. Consistent with
previous findings, a hotel may also become more responsive to reviews as a result of poor
reviews (e.g. Wang et al. 2016). Therefore, responsiveness and average customer ratings
may simultaneously be determined. One possible way of avoiding endogeneity issues is
to use the lagged value of responsiveness as an instrument. However, it is suspected that
16

Previous research has repeatedly used online customer review ratings as a proxy measure of quality (e.g.
Dellarocas et al. 2010; McDevitt , 2014; Zervas et al. 2017; Hollenbeck et al. 2018).
17
While our purpose is not to observe whether and how hotels respond to individual reviews, an advantage
of calculating the average review rating is to avoid possible bias in individual reviews and highlight general
patterns of responsiveness and ratings. (See Clemons et al., 2006)
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responsiveness has a carry-over effect on average customer ratings because some
customers may infer firm quality by reading through not only recent but also past hotel
responses to reviews. Thus, using the lagged variable of responsiveness will not be a
sound choice of instrument in the analysis18. Instead, this study utilizes a “competitive
pressure” variable as an instrument that meets the two instrumental variable conditions:
correlation with the independent variable (relevance) and independence from the
dependent variable (orthogonality). The choice of the instrument will be further discussed
in section 2.4.5. In addition, an interaction term was created by multiplying
responsiveness and branded hotels to test the hypothesis that chain hotels may experience
less impact on customer reviews by responding.
To test the third hypothesis (H3) regarding the moderating effects of experience
on review ratings, we created another interaction variable between responsiveness and
experience in responding to negative reviews. In this study, experience is measured in a
relative term by subtracting the accumulated quarterly number of negative responses
from that of the peer group within the same class (star-level) and a dummy variable was
created to indicate “experienced hotel” as ones with higher levels of experience than the
average.
2.4.4. Control variables
First, the lagged average of reviews was included to control for the partial
adjustment mechanism normally observed in firm performance. Since a hotel rating is a
function of how well the hotel is performing based on customer reviews, inclusion of the

18

See Reed (2015) for additional discussion.
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lagged dependent variable adjusts the model for past performance (based on customer
reviews) and possible carry-over effects in customer reviews which were found in
previous studies (e.g. Hu et al. 2006, Moe & Schweidel 2012). In addition to average past
customer review ratings, cumulative number of reviews (seen as a potential signal of
hotel quality), can affect customers’ choice and their subsequent reviews. Hence, this
study controls for those factors. Both unobserved and observed time-invariant hotel
characteristics such as certain classes (star-level provided by TripAdvisor’s experts), size,
locations, and chain affiliation may affect hotel ratings. To control for such effects,
property level fixed effects were included in the regressions. This study also controls for
year and seasonal effects on customer ratings to control for common shocks in the market
that may affect customer reviews. Finally, the yearly moving average of peers’ customer
reviews was included to capture possible market level changes in quality which may
incentivize a hotel to improve on quality and subsequently enhance its customer reviews.
2.4.5. Model and Estimation
The final dataset consists of 350 hotels with 4,620 observations (from 2007 to
2015)19 . This study builds the first model to test whether the competitive pressure for
being responsive (H1) increases hotel responsiveness:
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽2 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , with i = 1, … , N and t =
1, … , T

(1)

Because the main purpose of the study is to examine the effect of peer pressure on a firm’s
responsiveness level, this study excluded the observations for which the percentage of responsive peers was
zero. This study re-estimates the model by including all observations and creating a dummy variable that
indicates whether the percentage of responsive peers is zero or not. While the sign of the main coefficient
of hotel responsiveness remained the same; interestingly, customer reviews for responsive hotels were
lower when their competitors were not responsive.
19
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Where 𝛽0 is the intercept and 𝑅𝑖𝑡 denotes the quarterly average of customer
review ratings of hotel i at time t. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a matrix of variables that affect hotel rating
including time-variant independent and control variables. 𝛾𝑖 is a matrix of observed and
unobserved hotel-specific time-invariant characteristics (fixed effects).
As mentioned previously, Model (1) has endogeneity issues between the main
independent variable (responsiveness) and the dependent variable (average rating)20.
Hence, this study employs an instrumental variable (IV) approach in a two-step
regression using least squared estimation. The choice of instrumental variable, which also
corresponds to the first hypothesis, is the percentage of responsive peers at time t-1. The
instrument meets the orthogonality and correlation conditions. Intuitively, as long as the
instrument is unrelated to unobserved variables that affect the average rating of a hotel,
the instrument would satisfy the first condition. Despite the lack of an official test for
orthogonality condition, the percentage of responsive peers is unlikely to be jointly
determined with average ratings or other unobserved variables that affect average rating
at time t. The second condition is satisfied by observing a significant estimated
correlation coefficient of the instrument in the first-stage regression21.
Since this study accounts for possible dynamics in hotels’ rating by including the
lagged independent variable, it automatically introduces another source of endogeneity
because of an apparent correlation between lagged dependent variable and the error terms
in Model (2). According to the estimation procedure introduced by Anderson & Hsiao
(1981), the second and lag of dependent variables were chosen as another instrument in

20
19

A chi-square test confirmed the endogeneity of responsiveness in the model (P value= 0.000).
See Table 6.
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the models. This instrument is correlated with first lag of dependent variable and
uncorrelated with the error terms (𝐸[𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ] = 0). This study uses ‘xtivreg2’ command
in STATA with cluster (hotel) robust standard error to estimate the models’
coefficients22.
To test the second and third hypotheses of moderating effects of brand affiliation
and experience in responsiveness on customer reviews, the interaction terms of
(responsiveness × chain hotel) and (responsiveness × experienced hotel) were entered in
the main model23.
2.5. Results
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics. Table 5 shows the correlations among
the main variables used in the regression models.
Hypothesis 1 tests the impact of peer pressure, resulting from an increase in the
number of responsive rivals, on focal hotel responsiveness to customer reviews. As
discussed before, Hypothesis 1 was tested through the first-stage regression models
presented in Table 6. The table also summarizes estimated coefficients for the variables
used as instruments for the endogenous variables (responsiveness, lagged average rating,
and the interaction terms regarding the second and third hypotheses).
22

Model (1) was tested using OLS estimation without including the instruments to observe whether
including the selected instruments changes the estimated coefficients of firm responsiveness, as a sign of
inconsistency in OLS estimation. The results show the IV approach generates the predicted theoretical
result: the effect of responsiveness becomes stronger compared with the results obtained from OLS
regressions. See Appendix 1.
Also, for robustness check, squared terms of control variables, cumulative reviews, total number of positive
and negative reviews were included in the estimation. However, the significance and the direction of the
estimated coefficient of responsiveness remained unchanged.
23

𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 (𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 × 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛 ℎ𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡 ) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
Model (2)
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 (𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝑥𝑝. 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 ) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
Model (3)

42

In Model (1), the significant and positive coefficient for responsive peers at time
t-1 indicates that an increase in percentage of responsive peers results in higher response
rates of focal hotels at time t. This finding is consistent across all three models in Table 6.
Importantly, these results confirm the relevance of the instrument24. In this same vein, the
results show that the relevance of the second lag of average customer review ratings
being used as an instrument for first lag of average ratings.
Table 7 reports the estimated coefficients of the second-stage regressions related
to the second and third hypotheses. While, due to the models’ specification (i.e. fixed
effects), this study cannot directly observe the effects of time-invariant variables (e.g.
star-level, chain or branded hotel) on average review ratings, the coefficients for timevarying variables are estimable. Model (1) in Table 7 includes the main independent
variable (responsiveness) as well as the control variables that may affect the hotels’
average customer ratings. The estimated coefficient of hotel responsiveness is positive
and significant, indicating that an increase in responsiveness can result in higher
customer review ratings; evidence supporting the second hypothesis. In addition, the
results show that the number of positive and negative reviews has positive and negative
impacts on average ratings, respectively. Cumulative number of reviews shows a
significant and negative impact on average ratings25. This study further re-estimated the
model across two time periods (2007-2009 and 2012-2014) to observe the effects of time
on the impact of hotels’ responsiveness. Based on a conjecture that, in the earlier years,

24

The semi-partial correlation of responsiveness with the peer pressure variable at t is 0.45 in the first
model.
25
A curvilinear effect (U-shaped) of cumulative reviews on average ratings was detected after including its
squared term. However, the sign and significance of estimated coefficients of responsiveness remains
unchanged.
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customers may not have extensively used customer reviews on TripAdvisor, hotels may
experience less pressure to respond to the reviews. However, as the platform became
mature and popular among customers, firms may have reacted differently as the
competition for better customer reviews increased. Interestingly, some evidence was
found showing that the impact of responsiveness is negative but insignificant in the early
period, but it becomes positive and significant during the later years26. See Appendix 2.
Model (2) in Table 7 shows consistent findings with regard to the second part of
Hypothesis 2: increases in responsiveness have stronger effects on customer reviews for
independent hotels. The negative and partially significant coefficient of interaction
variable (responsiveness × branded hotel) weakly confirms this hypothesis. According to
Hypothesis 3, Model (3) tests a moderating effect of experience of responding to negative
reviews (a learning effect) on the relationship between responsiveness and customer
review ratings. The positive but insignificant coefficient of the interaction variable
(responsiveness × experienced hotel) does not support the third hypothesis that hotels
with more experience may craft ‘better’ responses to their reviewers to manage their
quality expectations and avoid negative reviews in the future. This study also re-estimates
Model (3) and tests if the effect varies based on brand affiliation. The results (see
Appendix 3) show that the relationship is partially significant for chain hotels, implying
that the positive impact of experience may be limited to branded hotels that may possess
systematic learning processes and strategies for effective responsiveness.

This study also tests the effect of responsiveness on customer ratings based on whether firms have ‘built
reputation’ or not. To operationalize this reputation variable, hotels were categorized based on the number
of reviews at time t relative to that of the average of its rivals. Hotels with more than the average number of
reviews for their rivals were considered ‘reputed hotels’. The results showed that the effect of
responsiveness is stronger when firms have not built their reputation (not reputed). See Appendix 4.
26
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Table 4 Summary statistics
Variable

# Obs.

Mean

SD

Min

Max

Average review ratings (log)

4,620

1.407

0.130

0

1.609

Responsiveness (%)

4,620

0.564

0.376

0.005

1

Response experience (log)

4,620

4.417

1.763

0.095

8.176

Responsive peers (%)

4,620

0.494

0.138

0.018

0.781

Cumulative number of reviews

4,620

712.511

785.193

1

6687

Number of negative reviews

4,620

3.915

6.703

0

99

Number of positive reviews

4,620

55.756

53.114

0

372

Hotel size (number of rooms) (log)

4,600

2.248

0.355

0.602

3.291

Chain hotel

4,612

0.491

0.499

0

1

Hotel Price level 1

4,612

0.061

0.240

0

1

Hotel Price level 2

4,612

0.189

0.392

0

1

Hotel Price level 3

4,605

0.238

0.426

0

1

Hotel Price level 4

4,612

0.244

0.429

0

1

Hotel Price level 5

4,620

0.265

0.441

0

1

Hotel Class 1 (star level)

4,612

0.001

0.041

0

1

Hotel Class 2

4,612

0.040

0.197

0

1

Hotel Class 2.5

4,612

0.015

0.124

0

1

Hotel Class 3

4,612

0.230

0.421

0

1

Hotel Class 3.5

4,612

0.139

0.346

0

1

Hotel Class 4

4,612

0.364

0.481

0

1

Hotel class 4.5

4,612

0.121

0.326

0

1

Hotel Class 5

4,620

0.091

0.287

0

1

Upper town district

4,612

0.100

0.300

0

1

Lower town district

4,612

0.204

0.403

0

1

Wall-street district

4,612

0.047

0.212

0

1
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Midtown east district

4,612

0.187

0.390

0

1

Lower East district

4,612

0.021

0.144

0

1

China town district

4,612

0.011

0.106

0

1

Times square district

4,620

0.427

0.494

0

1

Table 5 Correlation coefficients for time-variant variables
variable

1

2

3

4

5

1

Average review ratings(log)

1.00

2

Responsiveness (%)

0.02

1.00

3

Response experience (log)

0.16

0.54

1.00

4

Responsive peers (%)

0.24

0.17

0.45

1.00

5

Cumulative number of reviews

0.05

0.03

0.55

0.30

1.00

6

Number of negative reviews

7

Number of positive reviews

-0.33
0.18

0.03
0.04

0.33
0.55

0.16
0.34

0.60
0.80
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6

7

1.00
0.59

1.00

Table 6 First-stage IV regression coefficients and t-statistics

Endogenous variables
Excluded instruments

Av.
rating
(t-1)

Model (1)
Resp.(t)

Av. rating
(t-1)

Model (2)
Resp.(t)

Resp.(t)
×chain

Av. rating
(t-1)

Model (3)
Resp.(t)

Resp.(t)
×exp.

Av. review ratings
(t-2)

0.152***
(0.020)
t= 7.36

-0.065
(0.060)
t= -1.08

0.153***
(0.020)
t=7.38

-0.066
(0.061)
t=-1.08

-0.052
(0.043)
t=-1.20

0.152***
(0.020)
t=7.35

-0.065
(0.061)
t=-1.07

0.530
(0.036)
t=-0.63

Responsive peers
(t-1)

0.027**
(0.010)
t=-2.75

0.331***
(0.033)
t=9.67

0.026*
(0.011)
t=-2.28

0.310***
(0.043)
t=7.07

-0.049*
(0.021)
t=-2.35

-0.027**
(0.010)
t=-2.73

0.324***
(0.034)
t=9.38

0.017
(0.021)
t=0.82

0.060
(0.073)
t=0.82

0.545***
(0.055)
t=9.83
-0.003*
(0.008)
t=-0.36

0.052
(0.050)
t=1.05

1.051***
(0.059)
t=17.79

Responsive peers
(t-1) ×
Chain
Responsive peers
(t-1) ×
Experienced hotel(t)
Number of clusters
(hotels)

300

300

299

299

299

300

300

300

Observations

4180

4180

4172

4172

4172

4180

4180

4180

F test for excluded
33.96
47.80
23.52
32.52
33.30
22.64
32.27
106.59
instruments
Note: The dependent variable is the log of average of customer review rating. Only observations with non-zero values of responsive peers are included.
Cluster heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. † p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Table 7 The effect of hotel responsiveness on customer review rating
Dependent variable:
av. review ratings (log)
Responsiveness(t)

Model (1)

Model (2)

Model (3)27

0.115**(0.038)

0.153**(0.047)

0.110**(0.040)

Responsiveness(t) ×
Branded hotel

-0.074†(0.039)

Responsiveness(t) ×
Experienced hotel

0.010(0.009)

# Negative reviews(t)

-0.0006***(0.0008)

-0.006***(0.0008)

-0.006***(0.0008)

# Positive reviews(t)

0.0007***(0.0001)

0.0007***(0.0001)

0.0007***(0.0001)

Cumulative # reviews(t)

-2.9E-5**(9.42E-6)

-2.9E-5**(9.41E-6)

-3.0E-5***(9.44E-6)

Average ratings(t-1)

0.563**(0.215)

0.541*(0.214)

0.563**(0.216)

Peers’ average rating (t)

0.015*(0.007)

0.014† (0.007

0.016*(0.007)

Season fixed effects
Year fixed effects

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Hotel fixed effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

33.07

25.83

26.32

300

299

300

Observations

4180

4172

4180

𝑅2

0.47

0.46

0.47

Weak identification test
(Cragg-Donald Wald F
statistic)
# of cluster (hotel)

Note: cluster heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. † p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01;
*** p < 0.001.

2.6. Discussion and Contributions

In this chapter, a study of the impact of firm public response to customer reviews
in online platforms was presented. Customer reviews may not only facilitate information
sharing among customers, they also create a constant opportunity for organization to
publically communicate with their audience by responding to customer reviews. The
question that remains whether that is what propels firms’ responsiveness. Also, whether
27

Marginal effects of responsiveness in model 2 and 3 are 0.117 and 0.115, respectively.
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and under what conditions is responsiveness beneficial for firms? To answer these
questions, this study first hypothesizes that the peer pressure from responsive rivals may
derive a focal firm reaction to respond to its reviews as well. This study utilized this
initial conjecture to implement an instrumental variable approach and hypothesized that
responsiveness has positive impacts on customer review ratings by reducing firms’
“untruthful” (uninformative) responses to customer reviews. Untruthful responses are
inhibited by the potential cost of damage to firms’ reputation. Reputation damage may
occur if customers become misled by firms’ untruthful response and they decide to write
negative reviews.
Moreover, the current study showed some evidence whether the impact of brands and
firm experience in responding to reviews has moderating effects on customer reviews.
The study found that firm responsiveness has a weaker effect for branded hotels relative
to independent hotels. Such a finding further signifies the role of the brand as a strong
quality signal that may ‘insulate’ branded hotels from the effects of customer reviews on
hotels performance such as sales. Further, some support was found for the hypothesis that
firms with experience in response to customers may be more effective in terms of how
they deliver their responses to avoid customer negative reviews that may damage their
reputation; however, the effect is limited to branded hotels which may follow more
effective procedures to respond and learn from negative customer reviews.
This study provides three distinct contributions to the literature. First, it extends
the current literature related to firms’ reactivity (responsiveness) to third-party public
performance evaluation. Most previous research on this topic offers explanations of
firms’ response (reactions) toward public negative evaluations (e.g. by media, ranking
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institutions, investors (e.g. Martins, 2005; Espeland & Sauder, 2007; Ward et al., 2009)).
In contrast, this study provides an alternative explanation in the context of online
platforms in which firms may face constant customer evaluations. The need for firms’
response to customers will be more pronounced as such platforms grow in popularity.
Moreover, this study highlights how those online platforms provide a natural context in
which firms can closely observe their rivals’ behavior. Hence, this study brings into the
picture the impact of observable competitors’ actions on behavior formation among firms
competing within the same channel. This impact may result in increased information
revelation and efficiency in the market place.
The second contribution involves confirming the potential benefit of firm
responsiveness. Previous research on the impact of firm response to customer reviews
offers some (inconsistent) evidence on the short-run effect of public response on reviews
(Proserpio & Zervas, 2017; Chevalier et al., 2018; Wang & Chaudhry, 2018). However,
building on the argument that firms’ untruthful responses may intensify negative
customer reviews and damage firms’ current reputation (achieved by past customer
reviews), this study provides some evidence that reputational concern can increase
informative responses under competition and consequently boost customer reviews. This
study, therefore, contribute to empirical studies concerning firms’ claim making in
response to online customer reviews (e.g. Jin & Kato, 2006; Proserpio & Zervas, 2017;
Chevalier et al., 2018; Elfenbein et al., 2018).
The third contribution relates to the impact that brand and experience have on
communication (response) outcomes. This study finds some evidence that brand (as a
signal of quality) reduces the impact of firms’ response. Further, in line with the recent
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research focusing on the positive impacts of message tailoring (Wang & Chaudhry,
2018), the content and style of firms’ response to individual customer reviews (Wang et
al. 2016), this study introduces a learning effect that may generate a condition under
which firms become more effective in responding to reviews in order to minimize
potential damage to firms’ reputations. Thus, response experience, if exploited, may
become a source of competitive advantage and helps a firm to choose the ‘best’ response
to individual customer reviews.
This study also relates to business practitioners whose products and services are
under constant customer evaluations and need to craft appropriate responses to customer
reviews. Many platforms such as Amazon, eBay, and TripAdvisor not only facilitate
customer evaluation through a review system, but also provide means for firms to
communicate with customers. As customer reviews may have an impact on firms, firms’
actions may entail severe impacts on future business as well. Hence, it seems necessary
for firms to develop clear strategies for managing their online communications, as many
potential customer look for ‘useful’ and ‘clear’ informational clues on only firms’ quality
but also other characteristics such as trustworthiness, accountability. This study found
that hotels may exhibit responsive behavior because their peers within the online platform
show the same behavior. Therefore, similar to brick-and-mortar businesses in which front
office staff and employees’ behaviors have direct impact on customers, investment in
recruiting and training responsible ‘online front office’ staff seems to be inevitable to
ensure sustainability in online business.
These findings also provide some implications for online review platforms’
design. Given firms normally have incentive to gain public appeal in their
51

communications, they may provide non-verifiable responses (babbling) (Almazan et al.
2008), or simply increase the amount of information they disclose to their audience
(jamming) to avert the expectation for responsiveness (e.g. Beiley et al. 2003). To deal
with such possible issues, platform designers can provide the users with informative
content by summarizing firm-generated information through various techniques such as
text mining and content analysis.
This study acknowledges a number of limitations. Generalizability of the findings
is limited due to firms are sampled from a single market. In markets with different levels
of competition, the response behavior could be different and in turn customers may
perceive firm response variably. In other words, although the institutional theory
prescribes that firms’ actions, in this case responsiveness, are driven by external factors,
it does not fully explain possible differences in firms’ actions. Finding an answer to this
question calls for further research on how potential organizational factors, for instance,
can moderate firms’ reaction to external pressure for conforming actions. Finally, this
study only examines the extent to which firms respond to reviews and its overall impact
on ratings. However, more nuanced analysis on response types to reviews concerning
various aspects of customer experience could shed more light on how exactly firms’
responses can influence customer ratings.
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CHAPTER 3
SPATIAL PRICE COMPETITION IN THE HOTEL MARKET: THE ROLE OF
ONLINE REPUTATION, QUALITY, AND LOCATION
3.1. Introduction
The notion that firms’ strategic behavior (e.g. pricing) and the resulting market
equilibrium depend on how similar competitors’ products (or services) are has been wellstudied and documented in the economics literature. One can think of this similarity in
terms of how close competitors are in terms of their products’ attributes (e.g. Berry et al.,
1995) or in terms of their geographical proximity (e.g. Hotelling, 1929; Salop 1979).
Under this approach, products are thought of as being located in a “characteristics space”
(e.g. Hotelling, 1929; Lancaster, 1966, 1979). This approach allows firms to compete
with each other with differing intensity: products located closer to each other in
characteristics space would compete aggressively with each other, and less so with rivals
that offer products with different attributes (or that are geographically distant). Given that
product similarity implies stronger competition, firms often make great efforts to
differentiate their products from those of their competitors.
While there is a natural tendency to become differentiated (i.e. offer distinct
products), the distribution of consumer preferences over the attribute space can give rise
to “localized” competition. Under this notion, firms compete for customers to the extent
that those customers are seeking products with the characteristics of the product being
offered; if many customers have strong preferences for particular attributes, then many
firms may locate close to each other (on or around that those attributes).
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Prior work, has, by and large, studied localized competition assuming that product
attributes are “fixed”. However, in many industries certain product attributes may be
“variable” (i.e. are frequently be updated). The prime example of such product attribute is
a product’s online rating (which can be interpreted as a proxy for a product’s overall
quality). The increasing importance of online shopping raises the question of whether the
notion (and empirical results) of localized competition in fixed attributes space extends to
time-varying attributes, such as firms’ online reputation. This paper contributes to the
empirical literature regarding this dimension.
An ideal setting for this study is the lodging industry. On the one hand, fixed
product attributes (geographic location, hotel tier) are central to characterizing
competition among hotels. On the other hand, the lodging industry is heavily influenced
by online platforms (e.g. TripAdvisor, Expedia). These platforms facilitate consumers’
search for information regarding their fixed attributes as well as their time-varying
attributes (i.e. consumers’ overall hotel rating). These platforms, through aggregation of
consumer reviews ratings and volume, provide measures of hotel “reputation” that are
continually updated. It has been well-documented that these online measures are of
economic importance in the lodging industry as they have been found to be associated
with higher revenues (e.g. Lewis & Zervas, 2016).28 More generally, firms have a strong
incentive to invest in building and maintaining good reputation when the quality of
products is not fully observable (e.g. Shapiro, 1983). This study seeks to understand the
role of online reputation on market competition through the lens of product
differentiation models. To best of the author’s knowledge, this study is the first to look at
These authors find that a one percentage point increase in a hotel’s rating is associated with 1.5% and
6.5% increase in its price and demand, respectively.
28
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the role of online reputation on price competition in the lodging market in this type of
models.29
Specifically, this study assesses the role of three main dimensions over which
(localized) competition might occur in the lodging industry. The first dimension is
geography: hotels’ proximity to each other on a map. The second dimension is hotels’
“quality” rating; this rating information is provided by a third-party organization based on
whether a hotel meets a certain number of characteristics or attributes and categorizes
hotels into different classes or “tiers” (from 1 through 5 stars; 5-star being the highest
quality tier); by construction, this product attribute is fixed as a hotel tier does not change
over time. The third dimension is hotels’ online reputation (generated from consumers’
online reviews/ratings of a hotel). One can think of this variable also as a measure of
quality, with the difference that this variable is generated by consumers (and not by a
third-party company) and that it is constantly updated. The overarching empirical
question is to investigate the degree to which firms’ proximity to rivals (along these three
dimensions) drives hotels’ pricing decisions in the hotel market. This study investigates:
a) which of the three factors of product differentiation matters most for hotels’ pricing
decisions, and b) whether and to what extent competition is localized: i.e. limited to (or
driven by) the nearest, or most similar, competitors in fixed and variable characteristics
space.
This research studies the role of the three dimensions of product differentiation
(geography, quality, online reputation) as drivers of (localized) price competition in the
Manhattan hotel market. The empirical approach employs distance metric technique
29

Related literature on the role of online reviews (e.g. on sales) is reviewed in section 3.2.
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developed by Pinkse et al. (2002), a method that is particularly well-suited for dealing
with competition among a large number of firms. With this approach, one models each
firm’s price reaction function to be dependent on the prices of all other rival hotels. In a
nutshell, Pinkse et al. (2002) propose to model the slope of the reaction function (between
firm i and j) to depend on the pairwise distance (in product space) between firms (i and j).
The technique has two advantages. First, it allows the researcher to avoid the
dimensionality problem (a large number of estimable parameters) that arises when
modeling price reaction functions in differentiated products markets. Second, and more
importantly for the purposes of this study, the approach allows for empirical tests of
which dimensions of the product space matter most for price competition (in the case of
current study, the three noted product space dimensions - geography, quality, and
reputation) in the Manhattan hotel market.
To implement the model, this study collects and employs a detailed daily dataset
of hotel prices spanning 161 hotels over a period of 2.5 years (926 days) and match it
with daily online reputation (volume and average rating) measures scrapped from
TripAdvisor’s website.30 According to the purpose of this study, the results aim to show
which hotels attributes (location, quality, reputation) are more important in determining
the intensity of competition among hotels. Further, the results seek to highlight whether
competition in this industry is highly localized. In other words, this study seeks to explain
to what extent hotels within geographical proximity react to each other’s pricing

30

Modeling price competition in this industry on a daily basis is important since hotel managers are, given
the fixed capacity, actively engaged in setting daily prices to maximize the revenue (Anderson & Xie,
2010; Talluri & Van Ryzin, 2004).

56

behavior. To this end, it tests whether the prices of four closest hotels explain a focal
hotel’s price.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 3.2 reviews the relevant
literature and contrast it with the aims and scope of the current study. Section 3.3
describes the data and methodology. Section 3.4 discusses the findings, and Section 3.5
provides some discussion and concluding remarks.
3.2. Literature Review
The literature on product differentiation and its ramifications (e.g. market power)
is vast. In this section this study limits the review of past research on product
differentiation on work most closely related to this study: localized competition and the
role of reputation on price competition. In doing so, this study highlights work related to
the lodging as well as other similar industries.
3.2.1. Product differentiation and localized product competition
The price competition model of Hotelling (1929), which allows for a single
dimension for product differentiation, has been expanded to allow for (more realistic)
multiple dimensions (e.g. d’Aspremont et al., 1979; Anderson et al., 1989; Deneckere &
Rothschild, 1992; Feenstra & Levinsohn, 1995). Empirical work has followed this more
realistic depiction of markets. For instance, to study price competition among
differentiated products, Pinkse & Slade (2004) consider alcohol content and product
types (e.g. premium, regular and light) of various beer products as sources of product
differentiation, while Berry et al. (1995) use various automobile attributes (such as
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weight and fuel efficiency). The role of geographic proximity (as opposed to proximity
in attribute space) has also been studied (e.g. Pinkse et al., 2002).
In both types of empirical work (those considering non-geographic sources of
product differentiation as well as those that entertain geographic location as a key
element in the analysis), the role of localized competition has been noted. Proximity in
attribute (non-geographic) space has been found to be crucial in a number of empirical
studies including Bresnahan (1981, 1987), Feenstra and Levinsohn (1995), Berry et al.
(1995), Kalnins (2003), Pinkse & Slade (2004), Richards et al. (2008), and Pennerstorfer
(2009). In these studies, products that are located near each other in product space
compete more fiercely (display larger cross-price elasticities) than those that are farther
apart. The role of localized competition among firms in geographic space has also been
noted, especially in industries where products are less prone to differentiation in attribute
space such as movie theaters (Davis, 2006), gasoline (Pinkse et al., 2002; Clemenz &
Gugler, 2006), and hotels (Lado-Sestayo et al., 2016). A common practice to determine
the proximity in attribute or geographic spaces is to compute and use (the inverse) of the
Euclidean distance between products (e.g. Pinkse et al., 2002; Pinkse & Slade, 2004;
Rojas, 2008). One additional element that contributes to localized competition is the issue
of bounded rationality: firms partition their competitive environment and limit their
reaction to a few immediate neighboring competitors (Gripsrud & Grønhaug, 1985,
discuss this issue in grocery retailing; Lant and Baum, 1995 analyze the lodging
industry).
In the lodging industry, studies have shown that proximity in geographic location
(Chung & Kalnins, 2001) and firm attributes, including chain(brand) affiliation, quality
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(proxied by different price scales) and firm size, influence consumers’ choices and results
in more intense competition among hotels (Buam & Mezais, 1992; Becerra et al., 2013;
Lee, 2015). In summary, prior findings have noted that hotels’ proximity (both
geographic as well as in attributes, such as quality are important factors in the
competitive environment. This study differentiates from previous research by attributing
quality to two different measures: fixed hotel star-rating and dynamic customer-defined
reputation.31 This study uses detailed daily data in one of the largest lodging markets in
the world to formally (and systematically) evaluate some of these earlier findings: a) the
role of geographic location and quality on price competition, and b) the existence of
localized competition (i.e. competition confined among the closest rivals). Regarding
localized competition in hotel industry, this study’s approach is similar to Baum and
Mezias (1992) and Kalnins (2016) studies of hotel failure rate due to competition. The
authors examine localized competition with the conjecture that firms compete with others
within “a certain range of their own position” (or called “competitive window”) and firms
outside of the range have no impact of the intensity of competition. However, relative
firm positions (due to change in quality) and market size (due to firm entry/exit) may
vary over time. This approach allows for including such dynamics in determining
competitive windows for each hotel.

31

As noted by Pavlou and Dimoka (2006), reputation generated by customer feedback and reviews act as a
source of differentiation among sellers and create price premium for reputable sellers in eBay online
auctions.
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3.2.2. Reputation and product differentiation
While consumers agree that, all else equal, higher quality products are preferable
to lower quality ones, it is not always the case that information about a product’s quality
remains fixed in time and that is readily available to consumers.32 Further, in the absence
of direct observation of product quality, firms selling products of similar quality may be
perceived by consumers as being different because one firm may have a superior
“reputation” (e.g. Caves & Williamson, 1985; Podolny, 1993), a possibility that can be
considered as another possible source of product differentiation. Finally, under conditions
of quality uncertainty, consumers can use a product’s reputation (created by sellers’ past
actions) to infer/proxy for quality (Spence, 1974; Podolny 1993)33 and reward reputable
sellers through higher paid price (Shapiro, 1983)34.
Inherent in many online markets is reputation mechanisms based on a complete
record of customer feedback (reviews) about sellers or products. Chen & Xie (2008)
proposed that online consumer review has become an almost free new element of the
marketing communication mix for firms. Unlike other forms of marketing strategies (i.e.
advertising), however, the information conveyed by online reviews is not generated by
the firm, but by prior users of the product. Using online market platforms, buyers can
easily locate products based on their most favorable features, such as location and price,
with minimum search costs. To help customers infer quality of products, these platforms

32

According to Perloff & Salop (1986), as the degree of information about all firms in a market moves
toward perfection, the equilibrium price also falls to the competitive price.
33
Particular to online market, research has indicated the impact of quality information such as ranking
(Ghose et el., 2014; Chen & Yao, 2016, Ursu, 2108), popularity (Filippas & Gramstad, 2016), customerreturn rate to seller (Jaffe et al., 2017) on consumer purchase decisions.
34
See Resnick et al. (2006) for a survey of the literature on the impact of reputation on price
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collect and summarize customer reviews about their consumption experience (consumercreated information) and rank products accordingly.
The empirical effects of online reviews has been noted at length, repeatedly
showing the positive impact of average rating on sales for different products and services
including restaurants, books, movies, and hotels (e.g. Chevalier & Mayzlin, 2006; Duan
et al, 2008; Anderson, 2012; Anderson & Magruder, 2012; Lewis & Zervas, 2016; Luca,
2016)35. Particular to the lodging industry, higher prior customer review ratings was
shown to increase ‘willingness to pay’ in other customers (Nieto-García & MuñozGallego, 2017).36 Further, research has shown that while average rating matters,
consumers also care about the volume of reviews (Park et al., 2007; Cheung, 2012; Cui et
al., 2012; Blal & Struman, 2014). However, unlike the research we present in this paper
(which looks at price competition), previous studies have been mainly concerned with the
impact of online customer reviews on individual firms’ performance (i.e. sales volume).37
The increasing availability of online costumers’ reviews has dramatically affected
the noted aspects regarding the availability of information about products’ quality and the
role of reputation as a source of product differentiation (or proxy for quality). On the one
hand, online reviews have increased the amount of information consumers have to assess
a product’s quality. Further, online reviews have become an important tool for firms’
35

See Floyd et al. 2014 for a review.
In this vein, Abrate & Viglia (2016) used the average of online customer ratings as an attribute in
determining hotel price.
37
Other work has shown that online market platforms’ have reduced price dispersion (Bar-Isaac et al.
2012,), increased price competition (Brown & Goolsbee, 2002; Bar-Isaac et al. 2012), enhanced product
diversity (Brynjolfsson et al., 2003), higher incentive for quality investment (Fishman & Levy, 2015), and
more reputable sellers (Hui et al. 2014). Importantly, the internet-enabled technologies and platforms such
as eBay, Amazon, TripAdvisor have significantly reduced informational asymmetries and consequently
have led to an increase in consumer surplus (Lewis & Zervas, 2016; Brynjolfsson & Oh 2012; Goolsbee &
Klenow, 2006).
36
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seeking to differentiate their products via an improved reputation. Given the noted link
between online reviews and products’ reputation (and therefore product differentiation, or
perceived quality), in the present paper we extend the previous research by treating online
reviews (both average rating as well as volume of reviews) as a dynamic source of
(vertical) product differentiation among hotels. Specifically, we test to what extent
hotels’ proximity in (online) reputation is an important determinant of price competition
in the lodging industry.38To best of the author’s knowledge, the study is the first to
consider reputation as a multidimensional factor of product differentiation in studying
spatial price competition.

3.3.

Methodology

3.3.1. Model specifications
The aim of this study is to examine the role of three product differentiation
dimensions (geographical, quality, and reputation) on hotel price competition, and to
assess whether competition is localized. The empirical approach of this study relies on
the theory of oligopoly price competition with differentiated products. Specifically, we
estimate the price reaction function that results from the first order condition of profitmaximizing firms (e.g. Bresnahan, 1987; Slade, 1986). This equation specifies how a
firm 𝑖 (in this case a hotel) responds to the prices of the rivals it faces:
(1)

𝑝𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖 + ∑𝑖≠𝑗 𝑏𝑖𝑗 𝑝𝑗 ,

38

𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁

This is of particular importance because in competitive and condensed markets in which vertical
differentiation based on location and product quality is limited (i.e. products are highly substitutable),
reputation may become a source of differentiation and thus price competition among hotels.
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Where ai is the intercept of the reaction function, pj is rival j’s price, and bij
denotes the reaction function slope of firm i’s price with respect to firm j’s price.39 With
many differentiated firms (in this application we use more than 150 hotels), the bij
parameters pose an empirical challenge as the number of coefficients to be estimated is
very large.40
To deal with the noted dimensionality problem, we adopt the distance metric
(DM) approach introduced by Pinkse et al. (2002). The solution proposed by Pinkse et al.
(2002) relies on the assumption that the slope bij is a function of the proximity (in
product space) between firms i and j. This proximity measure, which we denote as cij , is,
in turn, defined as an inverse measure of distance between products i and j (in product
space). For example, one can specify bij to be a linear function of proximity: bij = γcij ,
where cij = 1/dij , dij is the distance (in miles) between hotels i and j, and γ is a
parameter to be estimated. In this example, the dimensionality of the problem is reduced
to the estimation of a single parameter (γ), which measures the importance of geographic
proximity on price competition. As expected from economic theory, price competition
with differentiated products would predict an upward sloping reaction function (γ > 0).
In practice, estimation is carried out by specifying (1) in matrix form (for now this
study omits the error term and the time dimension in the data):
(1′)

P = A + γWP

39

A greater slope is associated with a greater substitutability (and hence implies a larger cross-price
elasticity)
40
Without imposing symmetry, the number of slope parameters is equal to 𝑁 × (𝑁 − 1).
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where 𝑃 and 𝐴 are 𝑁 × 1 vectors and 𝑊 is an 𝑁 × 𝑁 matrix with 𝑖, 𝑗 element
containing the pairwise proximity measure between hotels 𝑖 and 𝑗 (as described above).41
With this specification, price of hotel 𝑖 (the dependent variable) is a linear function of the
weighted price of the hotels that 𝑖 faces in the market, where each weight is given by the
pairwise proximity between hotels.
In this study, we apply the DM method to study the role that proximity, along
three different dimensions in product space, has on hotel competition. One of these
dimensions is the geographic location of hotels (i.e. proximity is based on the pairwise
geographic distance between hotels). Another dimension is hotels’ quality rating (also
known as a hotel’s “scale”). Since a hotel’s quality is measured based on an ordinal scale
(ranging from 1= “Midscale” to 5= “Luxury” scale, as the highest quality category), the
corresponding proximity measure is defined as a dichotomous variable: equal to 1 if
hotels 𝑖 and 𝑗 belong to the same “scale” and zero otherwise. The underlying assumption
for this definition of proximity (based on hotels’ tier rating) is that competition between
hotels is confined amongst hotels of the same rating (we later explain how this
assumption is consistent with industry practice). Hotel quality ratings are assessed and
provided by STR, a leading global company that publishes each hotel’s scale.
The third measure of proximity is also based on a variable that captures quality:
hotels’ online reputation (obtained from consumers’ online reviews). Since there is
evidence that suggests that, when assessing a hotel’s reputation, consumers use both a
hotel’s average online rating (measured on a 1 through 5 star scale) as well as the volume
of reviews (see section 3.2), we take into account both dimensions of online reputation
41

The diagonal elements of the 𝑊 matrix are zeros.
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when computing hotels’ proximity measures (section 3.3.2 presents details of this
calculation). As opposed to hotel tiers, online reputation is a consumer-generated
measure of quality. In addition, online reputation (volume of reviews and/or average
rating) differs from a hotel’s tier in that it: a) is continuous variable, and b) changes over
time as consumers add more reviews and provide a hotel with a rating.
The empirical approach of this study is designed in a way that it allows for direct
tests of which of the three product space dimensions (geography, quality or online
reputation) matter most for price competition. Intuitively, if the slope of the price reaction
function (i.e. 𝛾 in equation 1) is significantly being driven by geographic proximity, for
example, this would be interpreted as evidence of geographic proximity being an
important factor in firms’ pricing decisions. To this end, we first examine the importance
of each of the three dimensions we consider by estimating separate models, each
considering a proximity measure based on different product differentiation dimension.
We then consider richer specifications, which allow the 𝑖, 𝑗 entries in 𝑊 to depend on
more than one proximity measure. Further, the DM approach allows us to construct
specifications that assess the extent to which competition is local (versus global). We
explain all these specifications next.
Incorporating the time dimension, specifying a functional form for 𝐴, and adding
an error component (𝜀) to (1’) yields:
(2)

𝑃 = 𝑋𝛽 + 𝛾𝑊 𝑐 𝑃 + 𝜀
where 𝑃 and 𝜀 are (𝑁 × 𝑇) vectors (𝑇 is the number of days in the dataset), and

𝑊 𝑐 is an (𝑁 × 𝑇) × (𝑁 × 𝑇) matrix containing 𝑖, 𝑗 pairwise measures based on proximity
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measure 𝑐. The 𝑋 matrix, with dimension (𝑁 × 𝑇) × 𝐾, contains 𝐾 variables that capture
(time-invariant) hotel characteristics, as well as market characteristics (we describe these
variables in the next section). The econometric tests rely on specifying different 𝑊 𝑐
matrices, which capture different notions of proximity (described in the next paragraphs).
Note that the product 𝑊 𝑐 𝑃 is, effectively, a weighted average price of rivals’ prices,
where the weights are given by the non-zero entries in the corresponding row of the 𝑊 𝑐
matrix.
Before explaining the different 𝑊 𝑐 matrices we consider, it is important to note a
previously noted advantage of the DM method: the researcher can specify proximity
measures that capture (and test) competition at a global level or, alternatively, at a more
localized level. An example of using the DM method to capture (and test) competition at
a local level is given by the proximity measure that uses a hotel’s quality tier: hotels 𝑖 and
𝑗 are given a proximity measure equal to 1 if they belong to the same quality tier, and
zero otherwise. This measure, by definition, rules out competition between hotels in
different quality tiers (an assumption that, as we later explain, conforms with practice in
the industry) thereby constraining competition to exist only locally (e.g. luxury hotels do
not compete with midscale hotels).
Conversely, an example of a proximity measure that captures competition at a
global level is a definition based on the geographic location of hotels: all 𝑖-𝑗 pairs of
hotels have a non-zero proximity measure (some small, some large), no matter how
distant they are. Another advantage of the DM method is that one can specify proximity
measures based on more than one product characteristic (i.e. multidimensional product
space); with this approach, one defines, for example, product space to have two
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dimensions (say geography and reputation) and uses hotels’ locations in this twodimensional product space to calculate the corresponding proximity measure (i.e. an
inverse of two-dimensional Euclidean distance; we provide details in section 3.3.2).
We create several 𝑊 𝑐 matrices with the objective of capturing different possible
drivers of price competition among hotels (Table 8). One dimensional (1-D) matrices use
one of the three possible product characteristics: geography (G), quality (Q) or reputation
(R). The only weighing matrix that we create in 2-D space uses both the geographic and
the reputation dimensions; this matrix assigns proximity values to each pairwise set of
hotels based on their (Euclidean) proximity in this 2-D space (see section 3.3.2 for
computational details). Table 8 also identifies if a weighing matrix captures a notion of
either global or local competition. As already explained, quality is only used to define a
localized measure of competition. While geography and reputation are used to create
global measures of competition, they are also used to create local counterparts; for
4

example, matrix 𝑊 𝐺 has an entry that takes a value of 1 for hotel 𝑗 if it is one of hotel 𝑖’s
4

four closest competitors (see also matrix 𝑊 𝑅 ). As with 1-D measures, proximity in 2-D
space is used to create a global measure of competition as well as a local one (i.e. 𝑊 𝐺𝑅 ,
4

𝑊 𝐺𝑅 ).
One reason that prompts us to study and test the hypothesis that price competition
is local (i.e. limited to a small set of competitors) is based on an institutional fact in this
industry. All hotels in the sample have a membership with STR; one benefit of this
membership is that hotels receive, from STR, a monthly report on their “main”
competitors’ performance. A hotel’s “main” rivals are typically limited to (usually) four
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competitors; these rivals are (in most cases) identified by the hotel’s manager42 as its core
competitors and are, usually, defined on the basis of geographic proximity, as well as
similarity (in quality/scale, size, and age).

Table 8 Weighing Matrices Created, by Product Space Dimension and Type of
Competition
Product Space Dimension
None: Baseline (product space
does not matter)
Geographic

Global Competition
𝑾𝑵 : all 𝑖, 𝑗 entries equal to 1
𝑾𝑮 : all 𝑖, 𝑗 entries equal to
inverse of Euclidean
distance (1-D)

Localized Competition

𝟒

𝑾𝑮 : 𝑖, 𝑗 entry equal to 1 only if 𝑗 is
one of 𝑖’s the four closest
(geographic) competitors (zero
otherwise)
One
Quality
𝑾𝑸 : 𝑖, 𝑗 entry equal to 1 only if 𝑗 has
Dimensional
the same quality rating as 𝑖 (zero
(1-D)
otherwise)
𝟒
Reputation
𝑾𝑹 : all 𝑖, 𝑗 entries equal to
𝑾𝑹 : 𝑖, 𝑗 entry equal to 1 only if 𝑗 is
inverse of Euclidean distance one of 𝑖’s the four closest competitors
(1-D)
in reputation space (zero otherwise)
𝟒
Geographic 𝑾𝑮𝑹 : all 𝑖, 𝑗 entries equal to
Two𝑾𝑮𝑹 : 𝑖, 𝑗 entry equal to 1 only if 𝑗 is
Reputation
inverse of Euclidean
Dimensional
one of 𝑖’s the four closest competitors
distance (2-D)
(2-D)
in GR space (zero otherwise)
Note: in all cases diagonal elements of the weighing matrix are equal to zero.

Finally, Table 8 also considers a baseline matrix (𝑊 𝑁 ), which assumes that
competition is: a) global, and b) that hotels’ proximity in product space does not matter at
all (all rivals’ prices are weighed equally). This matrix is useful in the empirical analysis
of this study since it helps to quantify (via the additional improvement in model fit,
achieved by specifications that do allow for product differentiation) the importance that
proximity has on competition.

This group of hotels is called the “competitive set”. The competitive set is defined by including hotels
that are nearby, belong to the same hotel scale, and/or are similar in characteristics (such as size and age).
While hotel managers have some discretion as to which hotels are its main competitors, STR has certain
rules that need to be followed by managers in identifying the competitive set (when these rules are not met,
STR asks the hotel to modify the set so that it conforms with STR’s rules).
42
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Table 9 describes the 𝑊 𝑐 matrices that are taken to estimation. For ease of
exposition, this study groups the created matrices by the number of product
characteristics used in creating the corresponding proximity measures in each weighing
matrix. Note that several of the matrices in Table 9 are the result of combining (through
element-by-element multiplication) two or three of the matrices defined in Table 8.
Consequently, matrices in Table 8 are a subset of the matrices in Table 9. Combining
matrices in this way allows us to capture and test richer (more complex) aspects of
competition.

Table 9 Weighing Matrices Used in Estimation, by Number of Product
Characteristics Used
# Product Space Characteristics Used
Two
𝑾𝑮𝑹
𝟒
𝑮
𝑾
𝑾𝑮𝑹
𝟒
4
𝑾𝑹
𝑾𝑮𝑹−𝑮𝑹 = 𝑊 𝐺𝑅 ∙ 𝑊 𝐺𝑅
𝑸
𝑾
𝑾𝑮−𝑸 = 𝑊 𝐺 ∙ 𝑊 𝑄
𝟒
4
𝑮𝟒
𝑵
𝑾
𝑾𝑮 −𝑸 = 𝑊 𝐺 ∙ 𝑊 𝑄
𝑾
𝟒
𝟒
4
𝑾𝑹
𝑾𝑮−𝑮 −𝑸 = 𝑊 𝐺 ∙ 𝑊 𝐺 ∙ 𝑊 𝑄
𝟒
4
𝑾𝑹−𝑸 = 𝑊 𝑅 ∙ 𝑊 𝑄
𝑾𝑮−𝑮 = 𝑊 𝐺 ∙ 𝑊 𝐺
𝟒
4
𝑹−𝑹𝟒
𝑅
𝑅4
𝑾
= 𝑊 ∙ 𝑊
𝑾𝑹 −𝑸 = 𝑊 𝑅 ∙ 𝑊 𝑄
𝟒
4
𝑾𝑹−𝑹 −𝑸 = 𝑊 𝑅 ∙ 𝑊 𝑅 ∙ 𝑊 𝑄
Note: the “∙” operator refers to the element-by-element matrix product.

None One

Three

𝑾𝑮𝑹−𝑸 = 𝑊 𝐺𝑅 ∙ 𝑊 𝑄
𝟒
4
𝑾𝑮𝑹 −𝑸 = 𝑊 𝐺𝑅 ∙ 𝑊 𝑄
𝟒
𝑾𝑮𝑹−𝑮𝑹 −𝑸 = 𝑊 𝐺𝑅
4
∙ 𝑊 𝐺𝑅
∙ 𝑊𝑄

4

For example, 𝑊 𝐺−𝐺 is obtained by combining 𝑊 𝐺 (a matrix capturing global
4

competition based on hotels’ geographic pairwise proximity) and 𝑊 𝐺 (a matrix
capturing local competition - based on hotels’ geographic proximity); when combined,
4

𝑊 𝐺 and 𝑊 𝐺 (both generated using the same product characteristic, 𝑮), produce a matrix
that has non-zero entries for the 4 closest rivals (in geographic space) with non-zero
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entries corresponding to pairwise geographic proximity measures. This combined matrix
allows us to test for richer drivers of price competition: a) with respect to 𝑊 𝐺 , 𝑊 𝐺−𝐺

4

tests whether localized competition (among the 4 closest rivals) may be more important
4

4

than global competition, and b) with respect to 𝑊 𝐺 , 𝑊 𝐺−𝐺 tests whether, conditional
on being one of the four closest rivals, geographical proximity matters.
The empirical approach is to estimate separate models for each of the weighing
matrices in Table 8, starting with weighing matrices that use only one product space
characteristic to define proximity. This approach allows us to gauge the explanatory
power of each product space dimension (either in isolation or jointly) in hotels’ pricing
decisions. To this end, this study uses the first weighing matrix (𝑊 𝑁 , a “naïve” model
since it treats prices of all rival hotels equally) to obtain a benchmark to which other
models can be compared against. As more product space characteristics are added to
compute proximity measures (or a variant that tests local competition versus global
competition), this study can gauge whether the added product space characteristic (or
local competition) brings in additional explanatory power (and can therefore better
explain price competition among hotels). More generally, moving from two product
characteristics and/or combining multiple weighing matrices, allows us to test for more
complex and/or more localized mechanisms of competition (as already explained).
3.3.2. Data and distance measures
This study uses a database consisting of 161 hotels in the Manhattan district in
New York City, with an aggregate room capacity of 63,572, comprising approximately
79% of the hotel room supply in this district. The Manhattan area is an interesting
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location to study hotel competition since it comprises numerous points of interest, spread
out across the district, that are sought out by both business travelers and tourists; thus, in
this market, one can say that customers’ preferences are spatially distributed, as required
by several models of product differentiation.
This study uses the daily average price (ADR), over the January 2013 to July
2015 period (926 days), as the dependent variable; the data is provided by STR, a firm
that collects data from almost all hotels in Manhattan. STR also provides, among other
variables, each hotel’s scale (tier). The data provided by ADR was anonymized. This
study was able to (separately) collect information on hotels’ geographic location and
online reputation. With these data (geographic location, tier and online reputation) this
study proceeds to compute the weighing matrices.43
First, this study obtains information on each hotel’s geographical location
(latitude and longitude) and compute the corresponding Euclidean distances all pairs of
hotels (𝑑𝑖𝑗 ).44 Finally, the corresponding proximity measure (which is used as the weight
between hotels 𝑖 and 𝑗) will be computed as the inverse of the Euclidean distance (i.e.
𝑐𝑖𝑗 = 1/𝑑𝑖𝑗 ). Second, this study uses STR’s hotel scale (tier); with this variable, STR
categorizes hotels based on their quality levels into five different classes: midscale,
upper-mid scale, upscale, upper-upscale, and luxury. 45 This scale variable is used to
create the corresponding proximity (weighing) matrix 𝑊 𝑄 (see section 3.3.2). Third, this
study uses online customer review data for all hotels in the sample to compute proximity

To preserve STR’s rules of hotel anonymity, the analysis does not reveal any identifiable information.
𝑑𝑖𝑗 = √(𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑖 − 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑗 )2 + (𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑖 − 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑗 )2 .
45
The lowest hotel is scale is “economy”. However, in the Manhattan market, this segment is nearly nonexistent (2 hotels). For this reason, this study excludes this category from the analysis.
43
44
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measures in online reputation (matrix 𝑊 𝑅 , see section 3.3.2). The data was scraped from
TripAdvisor’s webpage covering all the reviews posted during January 2003 and July
2015 period. Using this procedure, more than 314,000 reviews were obtained for the
hotels in the sample.
TripAdvisor was founded in 2000 and it is the world largest crowd-sourced
feedback platform in the travel industry. TripAdvisor allows hotel visitors to write textual
reviews and give numerical star-ratings (ranging from 1 to 5 stars) to hotels. Conversely,
the platform enables potential hotel visitors to customize the available hotels to be
displayed based on some attributes of interest including location, quality level, and value;
once these criteria are entered, potential customers observe, among other things, the
number of reviews as well as the average star-rating of the hotels. As indicated earlier,
since consumers are likely to care about average quality as well as volume of reviews
(see section 3.2.2), this study accounts for both of these measures as determinants of
hotels’ online reputation. The cumulative number of reviews is denoted as 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 , and the
average of reviews ratings as 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 . While these measures correspond to the period
under study (January 2013 to July 2015), their computation is based on data collected
prior to this time span46; this allows us to take into account the existent online reputation
of hotels as of the start of the dataset.
To include both measures of online reputation (volume and average rating) in the
pairwise proximity calculation, this study follows Pinkse & Slade’s (2004) approach and
compute the Euclidean distance between hotels, using the two online reputation measures
Since data was scraped starting in January, 2003, hotels’ volume and reputation measures as of January
2013 (the start of the period of analysis) were computed using data from January 2003 until December of
2012.
46
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as dimensions of the Euclidean space.47 Specifically, the online reputation proximity
matrix (𝑊 𝑅 ) will be populated with the inverse of the following Euclidean distance:
𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 = √(𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 − 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑡 )2 + (𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗𝑡 )2, where 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, . . , 𝑁, and 𝑡 =
1, … , 𝑇. Finally, this study populates the 𝑊 𝐺𝑅 matrix with pairwise proximity elements
equal to the inverse of the 2-D (geographical and reputation dimensions) Euclidean
distance given by 𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 = √(𝑑𝑖𝑗 )2 + (𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 )2 .48
3.3.3. Other explanatory variables
The X matrix in equation 2 includes a variety of fixed effects. To control for
weekly and monthly demand cyclicality, this study includes dummy variables for the
days of the week as well as months of the year. Also, to control for (time-invariant)
unobserved heterogeneity among hotels, dummy variables for each hotels were included
in the estimation. This study also experiments with specifications that in lieu of hotel
fixed effects included a number of time-invariant hotel characteristics to test the results
remain unchanged.49

47

Prior to computing the Euclidean distance, this study normalizes volume and rating distance measures so
that they lie in the [0,1] interval. Normalization is conducted by subtracting the minimum and dividing the
result by the range (max – min) of the distance measures (since reputation measures vary over time, this is
done at each time t).
48
As with elements 𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 , 𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 distances are computed by first normalizing the distance variables (using
geographic location, volume, and average rating) that are used for the computation (i.e. 𝑑𝑖𝑗 and 𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 ).
49
These characteristics included hotel quality, size (number of rooms), chain affiliation (e.g. Marriot, etc.),
and operation type (e.g. franchised, chain management, or independently-run). This study also included
market structure controls such as the concentration ratio within each hotel class (CR4), number of rivals in
the market, and a hotel’s rivals’ capacity (four largest competitors) . Finally, dummy variables were
included to control for systematic (time-invariant) differences in market conditions across the five
Manhattan districts that STR considers for this market.
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3.3.4. Model estimation
This study first estimates the model using ordinary least squares, and report
clustered standard errors. To deal with a possible endogeneity bias, an instrumental
variable approach is employed. The study constructs a price instrument based on the
assumption that hotels’ compete in a localized fashion with each other (an assumption
that was later confirmed in the regressions). To fix ideas, the empirical results (that will
be explained later in detail) indicate that a hotel’s price reaction seems to be limited to
the prices of its four nearest rivals. Thus, to instrument for the price of hotel z (an
explanatory variable) when hotel y decides its price (the dependent variable), this study
uses the prices of other hotels that meet two conditions: a) are sufficiently distant from y
such that these hotels are not one of the four closest competitors of y, and b) are one of
the four nearest competitors of z (excluding y). The instrument for the price of hotel z is
calculated as the average price across hotels that meet the two criteria above.50
Note that the instrument for the price of hotel z varies depending on which hotel is
being considered in the dependent variable (depending on the exact geographic,
reputational, and/or quality position of hotels, the instrument for hotel z may be different
if the dependent variable is the price of hotel y or if it is the price of hotel m). Intuitively,
as long as market conditions (i.e. demand and supply) in the set of hotels chosen to
construct instrument for hotel z are unrelated to unobserved market conditions in the
market being instrumented for (hotel y), the instrument would satisfy the required
orthogonality condition. Further, the condition that the instrument be correlated with the

50

The distance criterion used for the construction of the IV varies depending on which weighing matrix and
dimension (Q, R or G) is being considered.
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instrumented variable (the easier of the two requirements for an IV to be valid) is
satisfied since this study hypothesizes that a hotel’s pricing strategies react to those of the
nearest rivals: if z’s rivals react to the prices of their nearest competitors, and z reacts to
its rival’s prices, then the instrument must be correlated with the instrumented variable. 51
A similar IV approach is employed by Li et al. (2017), who rely on the idea of
using local demand shocks (measured by the intensity of consumers’ online search
activity) in one area of New York City to instrument for prices in another part of the city;
again, the idea being that prices of hotels in sufficiently distant areas of the city are
correlated with the prices one wants to instrument for because there is a domino effect of
sorts, and not (necessarily) because the two areas face the same demand shocks (or
because hotels in the two areas are direct competitors). Clearly, the identifying
assumption of this instrument relies on the researcher’s ability to account for common
market shocks (unobservables) that might affect hotels’ pricing across the board; obvious
candidates for these effects are city-wide market (i.e. demand) shocks; the inclusion of
day-of-the-week and month-of-the-year dummies alleviates a concern of an endogeneity
bias due to widespread market shocks.
3.4. Results
Table 10 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis.52
While hotels in Manhattan are expensive (average near $300), there is a large variance
(SD: $145), suggesting the presence of strong demand fluctuations throughout the year
(min: $30). A reason that Manhattan is a pricey hotel area is that many hotels are in the
51
52

This condition will be tested in the first stage results of the regressions.
Correlation coefficients among independent variables are reported in Appendix 5.
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higher quality tiers (Luxury 21%, Upper-upscale 28% and Upscale 33%). The most hotelpopulated district is Midtown-South, with 37% of hotels located in that area; the least
hotel-populated is the Financial district (6.7%). While weighted prices display similar
average figures, they do differ in their range (and, thus, in their SD), consistent with the
idea that the different weighing matrices respond to different hypotheses regarding the
determinants of price competition in the industry.
Tables 11, 12, and 13 display OLS results. Table 14 reports IV results. Each
column in a table reports the estimated coefficient on the variable of interest (the
interaction of the weighing matrix and the price vector – see equation 2). Table 11
contains results of regressions that only use one product characteristic to construct
pairwise proximity measures between products, whereas Tables 12 and 13 display results
of weighing matrices that use, respectively, two and three product characteristics (see
Tables 8 and 9 for details on these matrices). Table 14 shows results of specifications
with the greatest explanatory power.
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Table 10 Summary Statistics
Variable
Average daily rate (price,
$/room)
Review volume (number of
reviews)
Reviews average rating
(cumulative)
Hotel Size (number of rooms)
Number of rival hotels (within
same scale)
Luxury
Upper-upscale
Upscale
Upper-mid Scale
Mid-Scale
Midtown-west district
Midtown-south district
Midtown-east district
Financial District
Village/Soho/Tribeca district
Weighing Matrices x Average
Prices:
𝑾𝑵 × 𝑷
𝑾𝑮 × 𝑷
𝑾𝑹 × 𝑷
𝑾𝑸 × 𝑷
𝟒
𝑾𝑮 × 𝑷
𝟒
𝑾𝑹 × 𝑷
𝟒
𝑾𝑮−𝑮 × 𝑷
𝟒
𝑾𝑹−𝑹 × 𝑷
𝑾𝑮𝑹 × 𝑷
𝟒
𝑾𝑮𝑹 × 𝑷
𝟒
𝑾𝑮𝑹−𝑮𝑹 × 𝑷
𝑾𝑮−𝑸 × 𝑷
𝟒
𝑾𝑮 −𝑸 × 𝑷
𝟒
𝑾𝑮−𝑮 −𝑸 × 𝑷
𝑾𝑹−𝑸 × 𝑷
𝑾𝑮𝑹−𝑸 × 𝑷
𝟒
𝑾𝑮𝑹 −𝑸 × 𝑷
𝟒
𝑾𝑮𝑹−𝑮𝑹 −𝑸 × 𝑷

# Obs.

Mean

SD

Min

Max

135,309

294.98

145.39

30

3,869

126,387

1,148

1,018

1

6,772

126,387
135,309

4.15
374

0.338
318

1
97

5
1,966

135,309
135,309
135,309
135,309
135,309
135,309
135,309
135,309
135,309
135,309
135,309

29.86
0.212
0.284
0.327
0.151
0.024
0.267
0.370
0.115
0.067
0.182

8.638
0.409
0.451
0.469
0.359
0.154
0.442
0.483
0.319
0.249
0.386

3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

38
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

135,309
135,309
135,309
126,386
135,309
135,309
126,386
135,309
126,386
126,386
126,386
126,386
135,309
135,309
135,309
126,386
126,386
126,386
126,386

294.98
293.16
286.29
299.88
290.54
284.93
300.01
285.92
297.99
297.31
300.63
301.72
293.42
295.22
293.95
304.22
303.67
304.91
304.42

145.38
58.09
63.04
62.14
102.66
102.70
106.69
108.52
107.83
60.98
133.16
136.79
113.98
133.26
135.92
116.74
133.41
137.98
119.39

30
192.6
136.8
145.8
30
61.5
101.4
61.5
96.05
178.2
99.67
84.08
30
30
30
91.34
101.45
91.34
104.21

3,869.25
515.06
771.05
897.69
756.08
1,564.32
1,711.78
1,727.66
1,739.92
678.62
1,711.78
1,881.39
1,237.52
1,653.53
1,690.15
1,082.92
1,616.40
2,082.77
1,196.15
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As noted earlier, all regressions in Tables 11 through 14 contain day, month, and
hotel fixed effects; standard errors are clustered at the hotel level.53 Thus, the only
difference across specifications is the specific weighing matrix (proximity definition)
used.
To compare across different specifications and establish whether a particular
proximity measure is superior to another in explaining price reaction functions (and
therefore price competition), this study uses the fitness-of-model measure 𝑅 2 . This
measure is used instead of the magnitude of the estimated coefficient (𝛾), because
comparison of magnitudes of the coefficient across specifications is not straightforward.54
Model comparison using this procedure is intuitive: if a particular proximity measure has
a superior model fit, it means that (ceteris paribus), it is explaining a larger portion of the
variance exhibited by (and is hence a better predictor of) the dependent variable.

53

Results remain unchanged when clustering is carried out at the district level (see Appendix 7).
4
To note this, consider the 𝑊 𝐺 and 𝑊 𝐺−𝐺 matrices. A row in the 𝑊 𝐺 matrix has all but one non-zero
element, effectively producing a weighted average of rivals’ prices across all hotels in the corresponding
4
entry of the 𝑊 𝐺 × 𝑃 element. Conversely, 𝑊 𝐺−𝐺 uses the same weights (proximity measures) as 𝑊 𝐺 , but
has only 4 non-zero elements, yielding a weighted average of rivals that has a different scale than that of
4
𝑊 𝐺−𝐺 .
54
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Table 11 One-Dimensional Space Regressions (OLS)
Weight matrix:

𝑾𝑵
(naïve model)

𝑾𝑮

𝑾𝑹

𝑾𝑸

𝑾𝑮

𝟒

Estimated
0.996***
1.050***
0.910***
0.949***
0.829***
(0.022)
(0.031)
(0.032)
(0.035)
(0.040)
Coefficient (𝛾)
0.161
0.325
0.215
0.490
0.508
𝑅2
135,308
135,308
126,386
135,284
135,308
𝑁
Notes: ***P<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.0555. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; cluster: hotel.

𝟒

𝑾𝑹

0.338***
(0.039)
0.263
126,386

𝑾𝑮−𝑮

𝟒

0.798***
(0.042)
0.511
135,308

𝟒

𝑾𝑹−𝑹

0.310***
(0.037)
0.248
126,386

Table 12 Two-Dimensional Space Regressions (OLS)
Weight matrix:
Estimated Coefficient
(𝛾)
𝑅2
𝑁
Notes: see table 11.

𝑾𝑮𝑹
1.015***
(0.029)
0.291
126,386

𝑾𝑮𝑹

𝑾𝑮𝑹−𝑮𝑹

𝑾𝑮−𝑸

0.549***
(0.069)
0.512
126,386

0.555***
(0.069)
0.544
126,386

0.942***
(0.033)
0.675
135,284

𝟒

𝟒
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𝑾𝑮

𝟒 −𝑸

0.909***
(0.021)
0.741
134,486

𝑾𝑮−𝑮

𝟒 −𝑸

0.892***
(0.020)
0.756
134,486

𝑾𝑹−𝑸
0.880***
(0.045)
0.581
126,365

𝟒 −𝑸

𝟒 −𝑸

𝑾𝑹

𝑾𝑹−𝑹

0.616***
(0.052)
0.611
126,365

0.576***
(0.052)
0.605
126,365

In all regressions (tables 11-14), day, month, and hotel fixed effects are included. The reasons for the differing number of observations across
specifications is that STR data includes 161 hotels but online (TripAdvisor) review data only includes 154 hotels (specifications that include online
reputation have fewer observations).
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Table 13 Three-Dimensional Space Regressions (OLS)
Weight matrix
𝑾𝑮𝑹−𝑸
Estimated
0.968***
(0.035)
Coefficient (𝛾)
0.687
𝑅2
126,365
𝑁
Notes: see table 11.

𝟒 −𝑸

𝟒 −𝑸

𝑾𝑮𝑹
0.766***
(0.034)
0.744
126,365

𝑾𝑮𝑹−𝑮𝑹
0.757***
(0.035)
0.749
126,365

Table 14 IV Regressions56
𝟒
Weight matrix
𝑾𝑮
Estimated
1.431***
(0.111)
Coefficient (𝛾)
0.606
𝑅2
121,130
𝑁
Notes: see table 11.

𝟒

𝑾𝑮−𝑮
1.204***
(0.075)
0.515
108,544

𝟒

𝑾𝑮𝑹−𝑮𝑹
0.894***
(0.131)
0.601
117,736

𝟒

𝑾𝑮 −𝑸
0.925***
(0.042)
0.746
124,327

56

𝟒

𝑾𝑮−𝑮 −𝑸
0.942***
(0.042)
0.764
124,327

𝟒

𝑾𝑹−𝑹 −𝑸
1.185***
(0.098)
0.601
108,544

𝟒

𝑾𝑮𝑹 −𝑸
1.334***(0
.092)
0.738
121,130

𝟒 −𝑸

𝑾𝑮𝑹−𝑮𝑹
1.075 ***
(0.0700)
0.757
109,493

Some IV regressions contain fewer observations than OLS regressions because (for a few hotels) it is not feasible to generate a price instrument using
the introduced procedure (the procedure requires that, for a given hotel’s, it is observes there exist rivals’ rivals prices that meet the IV criterion;
sometimes this is not possible).
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To make model comparisons more straightforward, this study utilizes the “naïve”
model (𝑊 𝑁 ) as a benchmark; in principle, since proximity plays no role in the definition
of entries in 𝑊 𝑁 , any improvement in model fit achieved by a different weighing matrix
must be due to the importance of the corresponding proximity measure associated with
this weighing matrix. With this procedure, this study proceeds to analyze the regression
results in Tables 11 through 14, with the objective of determining which product
characteristic is most important in explaining competition and whether there is support
for the notion of localized competition
Focusing first on results from Table 11, the following conclusions can be reached.
First, of the three dimensions considered in this study (𝐺, 𝑅, 𝑄), similarity in hotels
quality (𝑄), seems to matter most for price competition (𝑅 2 of 0.559 v. 0.161 from the
naïve model). The second most important dimension appears to be geographic (𝑅 2 of
0.325), whereas proximity on online reputation ads relatively little explanatory power
over the naïve model (𝑅 2 of 0.215).
Second, this study observes that localized competition is very important in this
market. There are several reasons that justify this conclusion. Proximity of hotels along
the 𝑄 dimension (the one with the most explanatory power) is, by definition, a measure
of localized competition (proximity of hotels in the same scale is 1 and zero otherwise).
Further, when the other two dimensions (𝐺 and 𝑅) are used to create measures of
localized competition (e.g. four closest competitors in 𝐺 or 𝑅 spaces), their explanatory
4

power increases. This is particularly evident for the 𝐺 dimension: both 𝑊 𝐺 and 𝑊 𝐺−𝐺

4

have much larger explanatory power than 𝑊 𝐺 . While something similar can be said for
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the 𝑅 dimension, the added explanatory power that localized competition in the 𝑅
dimension brings seems to be, in comparison, only marginal.
The conclusions this study reaches using the results in Table 12 are consistent
with what was observed in Table 11: a) model fit is best when the quality dimension is
included to calculate pairwise proximity across hotels (regressions 4 through 9 in Table
12, which include 𝑄, have the highest model fit), b) geographic proximity matters, but
mostly when it is used to determine the four closest rivals (model fit is highest for 𝑊 𝐺
and 𝑊 𝐺−𝐺

4 −𝑄

4 −𝑄

), and c) online reputation seems to add relatively little explanatory power

(the highest model fits are reached when 𝑅 is excluded as a dimension for computing
pairwise hotel proximity).
The results in Table 13 indicate that the inclusion of all three product
characteristics in order to explain price competition may not be necessary as the model fit
in these specifications is not superior to the best model fit in Table 12 (achieved when
using only 𝐺 and 𝑄: 𝑊 𝐺−𝐺

4 −𝑄

). This is not surprising given what it is known from

Tables 11 and 12: proximity of hotels on the online reputation dimension appears to
contribute only marginally to explaining price competition in this industry (i.e. hotels’
similarity in quality and geography may be sufficient to explain the drivers of price
competition in this industry).
Finally, IV results (displayed in Table 14) confirm the conclusions that this study
reaches with the OLS results. Importantly, the results indicate that the IV approach
produces the expected theoretical result: the price reaction coefficient (𝛾) becomes
steeper compared with what it is obtained when the OLS counterpart is employed; these
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results not only confirm that the proposed IV works well in correcting the endogeneity
bias, but that the OLS conclusions remain unchanged despite of such bias.

3.5. Discussion and Conclusion
Focusing on one of the largest lodging markets in the world (Manhattan, New York), this
study attempts to show that to what extent hotels’ proximity in geographic and attribute
(quality and reputation) spaces plays a role on price competition. Finding of this study
reveals evidence on the most important drivers of price competition. Further, the results
will shed some light in understanding whether competition in this industry is (highly)
localized: hotels’ prices react most aggressively to prices set by the a few nearest hotels
in the area, and whether the effect gets compounded if the nearest hotels are hotels of the
same quality tier.
Of particular interest of this study, evidence was found on extent to which
proximity in (online) reputation has explanatory power in the pricing decisions of hotels,
although it is much less important than geography or quality. In other words, due to
ubiquitous role of customer reviews in influencing firms’ demand, the findings suggest
that there might be opportunities for hotel managers to improve their profitability through
their dynamic pricing decisions. Specifically, since reaction functions (the theoretical
construct upon which this study builds the empirical strategy) should represent optimal
behavior, the estimated coefficient on such reaction function (when using online
reputation proximity) may be capturing a flatter than optimal reaction. While an answer
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to this hypothesis lies beyond the scope of this paper, it is a question that is worth
pursuing in future research.
While the reported evidence of localized competition in the lodging industry
among the noted product differentiation dimensions is compelling, it displays both
limitations as well as opportunities for future research. While studying the Manhattan
hotel market may seem to limit the scope and generalizability of the current research, the
ubiquity of online reviews across industries provides interesting and timely opportunities
to investigate the role of time-varying product attributes in price competition models
particularly in industries where revenue management (e.g. daily pricing) is a common
practice. Another limitation of this research is that, while price competition for room
prices is studied, hotels may also compete (generate revenue) along other dimensions
(amenities) such as restaurants, casinos, clubs, meeting space, etc.; availability of allinclusive revenue data, not currently at the disposal of researchers, would make this type
of research possible.
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APPENDIX 1
THE EFFECT OF HOTEL RESPONSIVNESS ON CUSTOMER REVIEW
RATINGS (OLS)

Dependent variable:
av. review ratings (log)
Responsiveness(t)

Model (1)

Model (2)

Model (3)

0.001(0.006)

0.008(0.009)

-0.001(0.006)

Responsiveness(t) × Branded
hotel

-0.013(0.010)

Responsiveness(t) ×
Experienced hotel

0.0005***(9.5E-5)

# Negative reviews(t)

-0.007***(0.0008)

-0.007***(0.0007)

-0.007***(0.0008)

# Positive reviews(t)

0.001***(8.9E-5)

0.001***(8.9E-5)

0.001***(9.1E-5)

Cumulative # reviews(t)

-3.4E-5***(6.79E-6)

-3.4E-5***(6.79E-6)

-4.9E-5***(7.9E-5)

Average ratings(t-1)

0.164***(0.028)

0.165***(0.028)

0.162***(0.028)

Peers’ average rating (t)

0.013†(0.007)

0.013† (0.007)

0.013† (0.007)

Season fixed effects
Year fixed effects

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Hotel fixed effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

# of cluster(hotel)

320

299

320

Observations

4201

4193

4201

0.47

0.47

0.43

𝑅

2

Note: The dependent variable is the log of average of customer review rating. Only observations
with non-zero values of responsive peers are included. Cluster heteroskedasticity robust standard
errors in parentheses. † p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
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APPENDIX 2
THE EFFECT OF HOTEL RESPONSIVENESS ON CUSTOMER REVIEW
RATINGS IN EARLIER AND LATER YEARS

Responsiveness(t)
# Negative reviews(t)
# Positive reviews(t)
Cumulative # reviews(t)
Average ratings(t-1)
Peers’ average rating (t)
Season fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Hotel fixed effects
# of cluster(hotel)
Observations
𝑅2

2007-2009
-0.423(1.217)
-0.025†(0.0002)
0.005(0.006)
-0.0001(0.0002)
-1.974(4.340)
-0.061(0.174)
Yes
Yes
Yes
132
570
0.15

Note: see the table in Appendix 1.
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2012-2014
0.084(0.057)
-0.005***(0.0008)
0.0006(0.0002)
-3.8E-6(9.6E-6)
0.681(0.514)
0.010(0.009)
Yes
Yes
Yes
310
3104
0.61

APPENDIX 3
THE EFFECT OF EXPREICNED HOTELS’ RESPONSIVNESS ON CUSTOMER
REVIEW RATINGS; BRNADED VERSUS INDEPENDENT HOTELS

Chain (branded)
0.052†(0.031)

Independent
0.151†(0.089)

Responsiveness(t) ×
Experienced hotel(t)

0.017†(0.008)

-0.003(0.025)

# Negative reviews(t)
# Positive reviews(t)
Cumulative # reviews(t)
Average ratings(t-1)
Peers’ average rating (t)

-0.007**(0.0007)
0.0006***(0.0001)
-2.20E-5**(7.7E-6)
0.711***(0.197)
0.014(0.009)

-0.005***(0.001)
0.0008**(0.0002)
-3.9E-5*(1.8E-5)
0.401(0.372)
0.015(0.011)

Season fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Hotel fixed effect
# of cluster(hotel)
Observations
𝑅2

Yes
Yes
Yes
142
2037
0.54

Yes
Yes
Yes
173
2158
0.38

Responsiveness(t)

Note: see the table Appendix 1.
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APPENDIX 4
THE EFFECT OF HOTEL RESPONSIVNESS ON CUSTOMER REVIEW
RATINGS; REPUTED VERUSUS NON-REPUTED HOTELS

Responsiveness(t)
# Negative reviews(t)
# Positive reviews(t)
Cumulative # reviews(t)
Cumulative # reviews(t)squared
Average ratings(t-1)
Peers’ average rating (t)

Reputed
0.098*(0.048)
-0.004***(0.0005)
0.0005***(8.9E-5)
-6.9E-5***(1.4E-5)
8.5E-9***(2.0E-9)
0.798***(0.144)
0.013(0.009)

Not-reputed
0.126*(0.061)
-0.013***(0.002)
0.001***(0.0005)
-0.0002**(8.4E-5)
8.5E-6*(3.7E-7)
0.389(0.409)
0.011(0.011)

Season fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Hotel fixed effect
# of cluster(hotel)
Observations
𝑅2

Yes
Yes
Yes
137
1875
0.66

Yes
Yes
Yes
247
2323
0.35

Note: see the table Appendix 1.
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APPENDIX 5
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS AMONG IDEPENDENT VARIABLES

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Average daily
rate (price)
Review volume
Reviews avg
rating (cum)
Hotel Size
Number of rivals
(within class)
Luxury
Upper-up Scale
Upscale
Upper-mid Scale
Mid-Scale
Midtown-west
district
Midtown-south
district
Midtown-east
district
Financial District
Village/Soho/Tri
beca district

1
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

-0.071
0.300

1
-0.064

1

-0.049
0.068

0.605
0.008

-0.352
0.013

1
0.100

1

0.565
-0.078
-0.263
-0.229
-0.087
0.091

-0.029
0.184
-0.11
-0.088
0.084
0.316

0.213
-0.068
-0.098
-0.074
0.063
-0.078

-0.034
0.260
-0.152
-0.100
0.016
0.409

-0.213

-0.201

0.176

0.157

0.132

0.000
0.027

-0.051
-0.218

0.010
0.492
0.108
-0.642
-0.445
-0.045

1
-0.370
-0.390
-0.233
-0.074
-0.013

1
-0.421
-0.251
-0.080
0.013

1
-0.265
-0.085
-0.044

1
-0.051
0.035

1
0.061

1

-0.370

-0.139

-0.278

-0.069

0.215

0.144

0.029

-0.500

1

-0.166

0.261

0.194

0.118

0.125

-0.106

-0.154

-0.049

-0.243

-0.310

1

0.076
-0.032

-0.018
-0.249

0.070
0.020

0.192
0.168

0.011
-0.049

-0.140
-0.052

-0.059
-0.060

-0.030
-0.053

-0.146
-0.260

-0.186
-0.330

-0.091
-0.161
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12

13

14

1
-0.097

APPENDIX 6
REGRESSIONS USING TIME-INVARIATE VARIABLES INSTEAD OF HOTEL FIXED EFFECTS

One-Dimensional Space Regressions (OLS)
Weight matrix:

𝑾𝑵
(naïve model)

𝑾𝑮

𝑾𝑹

𝑾𝑸

𝑾𝑮

𝟒

𝟒

𝑾𝑹

Estimated
0.995***
1.314***
1.109***
0.759***
0.750***
(0.022)
(0.168)
(0.116)
(0.040)
(0.138)
Coefficient (𝛾)
0.570
0.639
0.597
0.563
0.706
𝑅2
135,309
135,308
126,386
135,284
135,308
𝑁
Note: ***P<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; cluster: hotel

𝑾𝑮−𝑮

0.518***
(0.111)
0.615
126,386

𝟒

𝟒

𝑾𝑹−𝑹

0.695***
(0.139)
0.708
135,308

0.484***
(0.106)
0.605
126,386

Two-dimensional Space Regressions (OLS)
Weight matrix:

𝑾𝑮𝑹

Estimated Coefficient 1.466***
(0.161)
(𝛾)
0.641
𝑅2
126,386
𝑁
Note: see the first table in Appendix 5.

𝟒

𝑾𝑮𝑹

0.633***
(0.111)
0.722
126,386

𝑾𝑮𝑹−𝑮𝑹

𝑾𝑮−𝑸

0.637***
(0.101)
0.738
126,386

1.184***
(0.153)
0.709
135,284

𝟒

𝑾𝑮

𝟒 −𝑸

0.834***
(0.112)
0.759
134,486

𝑾𝑮−𝑮

𝑾𝑹−𝑸

𝟒 −𝑸

0.820***
(0.097)
0.770
134,486

1.105***
(0.162)
0.647
126,365

Three-Dimensional Space Regressions (OLS)
Weight matrix:
W GR−Q
Estimated
1.318***
(0.165)
Coefficient (γ)
0.737
R2
126,365
N
Note: see the first table in Appendix 5.

W GR
0.798***
(0.132)
0.769
126,365
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4 −Q

W GR−GR
0.777***
(0.119)
0.775
126,365

4 −Q

𝟒 −𝑸

𝟒 −𝑸

𝑾𝑹

𝑾𝑹−𝑹

0.722***
(0.151)
0.680
126,365

0.673***
(0.139)
0.677
126,365

APPENDIX 7
REGRESSIONS WITH DISTRICT CLUSTERING

One-Dimensional Space Regressions (OLS)
Weight matrix:

𝑾𝑵
(naïve model)

WG

WR

WQ

WG

4

WR

Estimated
0.996***
1.050***
0.910***
0.949***
0.829***
(0.063)
(0.057)
(0.076)
(0.085)
(0.033)
Coefficient (γ)
0.161
0.325
0.215
0.490
0.508
R2
135,309
135,308
126,386
135,284
135,308
N
Note: ***P<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; cluster: district

4

W G−G

0.338***
(0.055)
0.263
126,386

4

W R−R

0.798***
(0.035)
0.515
135,308

4

0.310***
(0.050)
0.248
126,386

Two-Dimensional Space Regressions (OLS)
Weight matrix:

𝑾𝑮𝑹

Estimated Coefficient 1.015***
(0.070)
(γ)
0.290
R2
126,386
N
Note: see the first table in Appendix 6

𝟒

𝑾𝑮𝑹

0.549***
(0.075)
0.512
126,386

𝑾𝑮𝑹−𝑮𝑹

𝑾𝑮−𝑸

0.555***
(0.078)
0.544
126,386

0.942***
(0.040)
0.675
135,284

𝟒

𝑾𝑮

𝟒 −𝑸

0.820***
(0.029)
0.740
134,486

𝑾𝑮−𝑮

𝑾𝑹−𝑸

𝟒 −𝑸

0.791***
(0.036)
0.755
134,486

0.880***
(0.104)
0.581
126,365

Three-Dimensional Space Regressions (OLS)
Weight matrix
𝑾𝑮𝑹−𝑸
Estimated
0.968***
(0.060)
Coefficient (γ)
0.687
R2
126,365
N
Note: see the first table in Appendix 6

𝟒 −𝑸

𝑾𝑮𝑹
0.766***
(0.025)
0.744
126,365
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𝟒 −𝑸

𝑾𝑮𝑹−𝑮𝑹
0.757***
(0.036)
0.749
126,365

𝟒 −𝑸

𝟒 −𝑸

𝑾𝑹

𝑾𝑹−𝑹

0.616***
(0.076)
0.610
126,365

0.576***
(0.078)
0.604
126,365

APPENDIX 8
LOCALIZED PRICE COMPETITION REGRESSIONS

First-stage IV regressions
𝟒
𝟒
𝟒
Weight matrix:
𝑾𝑮
𝑾𝑮−𝑮
𝑾𝑮𝑹−𝑮𝑹
Estimated
0.676***
0.656***
0.442***
(0.060)
(0.036)
(0.027)
Coefficient (𝜃)
0.677
0.574
0.314
𝑅2
131,595
121,821
117,736
𝑁
Note: see the first table in Appendix 6.
θ represents the estimated coefficient on the instrument

𝟒

𝑾𝑮 −𝑸
0.685***
(0.022)
0.578
124,327
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𝟒

𝑾𝑮−𝑮 −𝑸
0.662***
(0.024)
0.547
124,327

𝟒

𝑾𝑹−𝑹 −𝑸
0.400***
(0.039)
0.524
108,544

𝟒

𝑾𝑮𝑹 −𝑸
0.638***(0
.046)
0.785
123,277

𝟒 −𝑸

𝑾𝑮𝑹−𝑮𝑹
0.505***
(0.045)
0.667
109,493

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aaker, David A. Building strong brands. Simon and Schuster, 2012.
Abrate, G., & Viglia, G. (2016). Strategic and tactical price decisions in hotel revenue
management. Tourism Management, 55, 123-132.
Adler, P. S., & Clark, K. B. (1991). Behind the learning curve: A sketch of the learning
process. Management Science, 37(3), 267-281.
Almazan, A., Banerji, S., & MOTTA, A. D. (2008). Attracting attention: Cheap managerial talk
and costly market monitoring. The Journal of Finance, 63(3), 1399-1436.
Anderson, C. (2012). The impact of social media on lodging performance. Cornell Hospitality
Report, 12(15), 6-11.
Anderson, S. P., De Palma, A., & Thisse, J. F. (1989). Demand for differentiated products,
discrete choice models, and the characteristics approach. The Review of Economic
Studies, 56(1), 21-35.
Anderson, T. W., & Hsiao, C. (1981). Estimation of dynamic models with error
components. Journal of the American statistical Association, 76(375), 598-606.
Anderson, M., & Magruder, J. (2012). Learning from the crowd: Regression discontinuity
estimates of the effects of an online review database. The Economic Journal, 122(563), 957-989.
Anderson, C. K., & Xie, X. (2010). Improving hospitality industry sales: Twenty-five years of
revenue management. Cornell Hospitality Quarterly, 51(1), 53-67.
Abrate, G., & Viglia, G. (2016). Strategic and tactical price decisions in hotel revenue
management. Tourism Management, 55, 123-132.
Argote, L. (1999). Organizational Learning: Creating, Retaining and Transferring Knowledge.
Springer Science & Business Media
Argote, L., & Epple, D. (1990). Learning curves in manufacturing. Science, 247(4945), 920-924.
92

Argote, L., & Miron-Spektor, E. (2011). Organizational learning: From experience to
knowledge. Organization science, 22(5), 1123-1137.
Argyris, C., & Schön, D. (1978). Organizational learning: A theory of action approach. Reading,
MA: Addision Wesley.
Audia, P. G., Locke, E. A., & Smith, K. G. (2000). The paradox of success: An archival and a
laboratory study of strategic persistence following radical environmental change. Academy of
Management journal, 43(5), 837-853.
Bailey, W., Li, H., Mao, C. X., & Zhong, R. (2003). Regulation fair disclosure and earnings
information: Market, analyst, and corporate responses. The Journal of Finance, 58(6), 24872514.
Bakos, Y., & Dellarocas, C. (2011). Cooperation without enforcement? A comparative analysis
of litigation and online reputation as quality assurance mechanisms. Management
Science, 57(11), 1944-1962.
Battaglini, M., & Makarov, U. (2014). Cheap talk with multiple audiences: An experimental
analysis. Games and Economic Behavior, 83, 147-164.
Bartol, K. M., & Srivastava, A. (2002). Encouraging knowledge sharing: The role of
organizational reward systems. Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies, 9(1), 64-76.
Baum, J. A., Li, S. X., & Usher, J. M. (2000). Making the next move: How experiential and
vicarious learning shape the locations of chains' acquisitions. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 45(4), 766-801.
Baum, J.A., & Dahlin, K. (2007). Aspiration Performance and Railroads' Patterns of Learning
from Train Wrecks and Crashes. Organization Science, 18(3), 368-385.
Baum, J. A., & Lant, T. K. (1993). Cognitive categorization of competitor groups and
perceptions of competitive intensity in the Manhattan hotel industry. Unpublished manuscript,
Department of Management, University of Toronto.
Baum, J. A., & Mezias, S. J. (1992). Localized competition and organizational failure in the
Manhattan hotel industry, 1898-1990. Administrative Science Quarterly, 580-604.

93

Baum, J. A., Rowley, T. J., Shipilov, A. V., & Chuang, Y. T. (2005). Dancing with strangers:
Aspiration performance and the search for underwriting syndicate partners. Administrative
science quarterly, 50(4), 536-575.
Becerra, M., Santaló, J., & Silva, R. (2013). Being better vs. being different: Differentiation,
competition, and pricing strategies in the Spanish hotel industry. Tourism Management, 34, 7179.
Berry, S., J. Levinsohn, and A. Pakes (1995). Automobile prices in market equilibrium.
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society 63 (4), 841-890.
Bettman, J. R., & Weitz, B. A. (1983). Attributions in the board room: Causal reasoning in
corporate annual reports. Administrative science quarterly, 165-183.
Blal, I., & Sturman, M. C. (2014). The differential effects of the quality and quantity of online
reviews on hotel room sales. Cornell Hospitality Quarterly, 55(4), 365-375.
Bower, J. L., & Christensen, C. M. (1996). Disruptive technologies: Catching the wave. The
Journal of Product Innovation Management, 1(13), 75-76.
Breen, J. O. (2012). Mining twitter for airline consumer sentiment. Practical text mining and
statistical analysis for non-structured text data applications, 133.
Bresnahan, T. F. (1981). Departures from marginal-cost pricing in the American automobile
industry: Estimates for 1977–1978. Journal of Econometrics, 17(2), 201-227.
Bresnahan, T. F. (1987). Competition and collusion in the American automobile industry: The
1955 price war. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 457-482.
Briscoe, F., & Safford, S. (2008). The Nixon-in-China effect: Activism, imitation, and the
institutionalization of contentious practices. Administrative science quarterly, 53(3), 460-491.
Brown, J. R., & Goolsbee, A. (2002). Does the Internet make markets more competitive?
Evidence from the life insurance industry. Journal of political economy, 110(3), 481-507.
Brynjolfsson, E., Hu, Y., & Smith, M. D. (2003). Consumer surplus in the digital economy:
Estimating the value of increased product variety at online booksellers. Management
Science, 49(11), 1580-1596.
94

Brynjolfsson, E., & Oh, J. (2012). The attention economy: measuring the value of free digital
services on the Internet. ICIS.
Bunderson, J. S., & Boumgarden, P. (2010). Structure and learning in self-managed teams: Why
“bureaucratic” teams can be better learners. Organization Science, 21(3), 609-624.
Caves, R. E., & Williamson, P. J. (1985). What is product differentiation, really? The Journal of
Industrial Economics, 113-132.
Chen, P. Y., Wu, S. Y., & Yoon, J. (2004). The impact of online recommendations and consumer
feedback on sales. ICIS 2004 Proceedings, 58.
Chen, Y., & Xie, J. (2008). Online consumer review: Word-of-mouth as a new element of
marketing communication mix. Management science, 54(3), 477-491.
Chen, Y., & Yao, S. (2016). Sequential search with refinement: Model and application with
click-stream data. Management Science, 63(12), 4345-4365.
Cheung, C. M., & Lee, M. K. (2012). What drives consumers to spread electronic word of mouth
in online consumer-opinion platforms. Decision support systems, 53(1), 218-225.
Chevalier, J. A., Dover, Y., & Mayzlin, D. (2018). Channels of Impact: User reviews when
quality is dynamic and managers respond. Marketing Science, 37(5), 688-709.
Chevalier, J. A., & Mayzlin, D. (2006). The effect of word of mouth on sales: Online book
reviews. Journal of Marketing Research, 43(3), 345-354.
Chung, W., & Kalnins, A. (2001). Agglomeration effects and performance: A test of the Texas
lodging industry. Strategic Management Journal, 22(10), 969-988.
Cicourel, A. V. (1970). Language as a variable in social research. Sociological Focus, 3(2), 4352.
Clemenz, G., & Gugler, K. (2006). Locational choice and price competition: some empirical
results for the austrian retail gasoline market. Empirical Economics, 31(2), 291-312.

95

Clemons, E. K., Gao, G. G., & Hitt, L. M. (2006). When online reviews meet
hyperdifferentiation: A study of the craft beer industry. Journal of Management Information
Systems, 23(2), 149-171.
Cohen, W. M., & Levinthal, D. A. 1990. Absorptive capacity: A new perspective on learning and
innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35, 128-152.
Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982). Strategic information transmission. Econometrica: Journal
of the Econometric Society, 1431-1451.
Crossan, M. M., Lane, H. W., & White, R. E. (1999). An organizational learning framework:
From intuition to institution. Academy of Management Review, 24(3), 522-537.
Cui, G., Lui, H. K., & Guo, X. (2012). The effect of online consumer reviews on new product
sales. International Journal of Electronic Commerce, 17(1), 39-58.
Cyert, R. M., & March, J. G. (1963). A behavioral theory of the firm. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 2.
Daft, R. L., & Weick, K. E. (1984). Toward a model of organizations as interpretation
systems. Academy of management review, 9(2), 284-295.
d'Aspremont, C., Gabszewicz, J. J., & Thisse, J. F. (1979). On Hotelling's" Stability in
competition". Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1145-1150.
Davis, P. (2006). Spatial competition in retail markets: movie theaters. The RAND Journal of
Economics, 37(4), 964-982.
Dellarocas, C., Gao, G., & Narayan, R. (2010). Are consumers more likely to contribute online
reviews for hit or niche products?. Journal of Management Information Systems, 27(2), 127-158.
Delmas, M. A., & Toffel, M. W. (2008). Organizational responses to environmental demands:
Opening the black box. Strategic Management Journal, 29(10), 1027-1055.
Deneckere, R., & Rothschild, M. (1992). Monopolistic competition and preference diversity. The
Review of Economic Studies, 59(2), 361-373.

96

DiMaggio, P., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Collective rationality and
institutional isomorphism in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48(2), 147160.
DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (Eds.). (1991). The new institutionalism in organizational
analysis (Vol. 17). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Dodgson, M. (1993). Organizational learning: a review of some literatures. Organization
Studies, 14(3), 375-394.
Duan, W., Gu, B., & Whinston, A. B. (2008). The dynamics of online word-of-mouth and
product sales—An empirical investigation of the movie industry. Journal of Retailing, 84(2),
233-242.
Duncan, R. (1979). Organizational learning: Implications for organizational design. Research in
Organizational Behavior, 1, 75-123.
Dutton, J. M., & Thomas, A. (1984). Treating progress functions as a managerial
opportunity. Academy of Management Review, 9(2), 235-247.
Elfenbein, D. W., Fisman, R., & McManus, B. (2018). Does Cheap Talk Affect Market
Outcomes? Evidence from eBay(No. w24437). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Elsbach, K. D. (1994). Managing organizational legitimacy in the California cattle industry: The
construction and effectiveness of verbal accounts. Administrative science quarterly, 39(1), 57-88.
Espeland, W. N., & Sauder, M. (2007). Rankings and reactivity: How public measures recreate
social worlds1. American journal of sociology, 113(1), 1-40.
Fang, C., Lee, J., & Schilling, M. A. (2010). Balancing exploration and exploitation through
structural design: The isolation of subgroups and organizational learning. Organization
Science, 21(3), 625-642.
Fang, L., & Yasuda, A. (2009). The effectiveness of reputation as a disciplinary mechanism in
sell-side research. The Review of Financial Studies, 22(9), 3735-3777.
Feenstra, R. C., & Levinsohn, J. A. (1995). Estimating markups and market conduct with
multidimensional product attributes. The review of economic studies, 62(1), 19-52.
97

Filippas, A., and Gramstad, A.R. 2016. “A Model of Pricing in the Sharing Economy: Pricing
Dynamics with Awareness Generating Adoptions,” International Conference on Information
Systems (ICIS 2016), Dublin, Ireland.
Fishman, A., & Levy, N. (2015). Search costs and investment in quality. The Journal of
Industrial Economics, 63(4), 625-641.
Fligstein, N. (2000). The spread of the multidivisional form among large firms, 1919–1979.
In Economics Meets Sociology in Strategic Management (pp. 55-78). Emerald Group Publishing
Limited.
Floyd, K., Freling, R., Alhoqail, S., Cho, H. Y., & Freling, T. (2014). How online product
reviews affect retail sales: A meta-analysis. Journal of Retailing, 90(2), 217-232.
Fournier, V. (1999). The appeal to ‘professionalism’as a disciplinary mechanism. The
sociological review, 47(2), 280-307.
Fradkin, A., Grewal, E., Holtz, D., & Pearson, M. (2015, June). Bias and reciprocity in online
reviews: Evidence from field experiments on airbnb. In Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM
Conference on Economics and Computation (pp. 641-641). ACM.
Gretzel, U., & Yoo, K. H. (2008). Use and impact of online travel reviews. Information and
communication technologies in tourism 2008, 35-46.
Gavetti, G., Greve, H., Levinthal, D.A., Ocasio, W. (2012). The behavioral theory of the firm.
The Academy of Management Annals, 6(1), 1-40.
Ghose, A., Ipeirotis, P. G., & Li, B. (2014). Examining the impact of ranking on consumer
behavior and search engine revenue. Management Science, 60(7), 1632-1654.
Goolsbee, A., & Klenow, P. J. (2006). Valuing consumer products by the time spent using them:
An application to the Internet (No. w11995). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Greve, H. R. (1998). Performance, aspirations, and risky organizational change. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 58-86.
Greve, H. R. (2003). A behavioral theory of R&D expenditures and innovations: Evidence from
shipbuilding. Academy of Management Journal, 46(6), 685-702.
98

Greve, H. R. (2008). A behavioral theory of firm growth: Sequential attention to size and
performance goals. Academy of Management Journal, 51(3), 476-494.
Gripsrud, G., & Grønhaug, K. (1985). Structure and strategy in grocery retailing: A sociometric
approach. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 33(3), 339-347.
Gu, B., & Ye, Q. (2014). First step in social media: Measuring the influence of online
management responses on customer satisfaction. Production and Operations Management, 23(4),
570-582.
Haans, R. F., Pieters, C., & He, Z. L. (2016). Thinking about U: Theorizing and testing U‐and
inverted U‐shaped relationships in strategy research. Strategic Management Journal, 37(7), 11771195.
Haleblian, J., & Finkelstein, S. (1999). The influence of organizational acquisition experience on
acquisition performance: A behavioral learning perspective. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 44(1), 29-56.
Hennig-Thurau, T., Gwinner, K. P., Walsh, G., & Gremler, D. D. (2004). Electronic word-ofmouth via consumer-opinion platforms: what motivates consumers to articulate themselves on
the internet?. Journal of interactive marketing, 18(1), 38-52.
Haunschild, P. R., & Sullivan, B. N. (2002). Learning from complexity: Effects of prior
accidents and incidents on airlines' learning. Administrative Science Quarterly, 47(4), 609-643.
Hirsch, P. M. (1986). From ambushes to golden parachutes: Corporate takeovers as an instance
of cultural framing and institutional integration. American journal of Sociology, 91(4), 800-837.
Hollenbeck, B. (2018). Online reputation mechanisms and the decreasing value of chain
affiliation. Journal of Marketing Research, 55(5), 636-654.
Hollenbeck, B., Moorthy, S., & Proserpio, D. (2018). Advertising strategy in the presence of
reviews: An empirical analysis. Rotman School of Management Working Paper, (3076239).
Hora, M., & Klassen, R. D. (2013). Learning from others’ misfortune: Factors influencing
knowledge acquisition to reduce operational risk. Journal of Operations Management, 31(1-2),
52-61.

99

Hotelling, H. (1929). Stability in competition. The economic journal, 39(153), 41-57.
Hu, N., Pavlou, P. A., & Zhang, J. (2006, June). Can online reviews reveal a product's true
quality?: empirical findings and analytical modeling of Online word-of-mouth communication.
In Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce (pp. 324-330). ACM.
Huber, G. P. (1991). Organizational learning: The contributing processes and the
literatures. Organization Science, 2(1), 88-115.
Hui, X., Saeedi, M., Shen, Z., & Sundaresan, N. (2014). From lemon markets to managed
markets: the evolution of ebay’s reputation system. Work. Pap., Ohio State Univ.
Ingram, P., & Baum, J. A. (1997). Opportunity and Constraint: Organizations’ Learning from the
Operating and Competitive Experience of Industries. Strategic Management Journal, 18(S1), 7598.
Jaffe, S., Coles, P., Levitt, S., & Popov, I. (2017). Quality Externalities on Platforms: The Case
of Airbnb. Working paper.
Jin, G. Z., & Leslie, P. (2003). The effect of information on product quality: Evidence from
restaurant hygiene grade cards. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(2), 409-451.
Jin, G. Z., & Kato, A. (2006). Price, quality, and reputation: Evidence from an online field
experiment. The RAND Journal of Economics, 37(4), 983-1005.
Kalnins, A. (2003). Hamburger prices and spatial econometrics. Journal of Economics &
Management Strategy, 12(4), 591-616.
Kalnins, A. (2016). Beyond Manhattan: Localized competition and organizational failure in
urban hotel markets throughout the United States, 2000–2014. Strategic Management
Journal, 37(11), 2235-2253.
Kalnins, A., & Chung, W. (2004). Resource seeking agglomeration: a study of market entry in
the lodging industry. Strategic Management Journal, 25(7), 689-699.
Kim, L. (1998). Crisis construction and organizational learning: Capability building in catchingup at Hyundai Motor. Organization Science, 9(4), 506-521.

100

Kogut, B., & Zander, U. (1992). Knowledge of the firm, combinative capabilities, and the
replication of technology. Organization Science, 3(3), 383-397.
Lado-Sestayo, R., Otero-González, L., Vivel-Búa, M., & Martorell-Cunill, O. (2016). Impact of
location on profitability in the Spanish hotel sector. Tourism Management, 52, 405-415.
Laland, K. N. (2004). Social learning strategies. Learning & behavior, 32(1), 4-14.
Lancaster, K. “A New Approach to Consumer Theory.” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 74
(1966), pp. 132–157.
Lancaster, K. Variety, Equity and Efficiency: Product Variety in an Industrial Society. New
York: Columbia University Press, 1979
Lane, P. J., & Lubatkin, M. (1998). Relative absorptive capacity and interorganizational
learning. Strategic management journal, 19(5), 461-477.
Lant, T. K. (1992). Aspiration level adaptation: An empirical exploration. Management
Science, 38(5), 623-644.
Lant, T. K., & Baum, J. A. (1995). Cognitive sources of socially constructed competitive groups:
Examples from the Manhattan hotel industry. The institutional construction of organizations, 15,
38.
Lapré, M. A. (2011). Reducing customer dissatisfaction: How important is learning to reduce
service failure? Production and Operations Management, 20(4), 491-507.
Lapré, M. A., Mukherjee, A. S., & Van Wassenhove, L. N. (2000). Behind the learning curve:
Linking learning activities to waste reduction. Management Science, 46(5), 597-611.
Lapré, M. A., & Tsikriktsis, N. (2006). Organizational learning curves for customer
dissatisfaction: Heterogeneity across airlines. Management Science, 52(3), 352-366.
Lee, S. K. (2015). Quality differentiation and conditional spatial price competition among
hotels. Tourism Management, 46, 114-122.
Levinthal, D. A., & March, J. G. (1993). The myopia of learning. Strategic Management
Journal, 14(S2), 95-112.
101

Levitt, B., & March, J. G. (1988). Organizational learning. Annual review of sociology, 14(1),
319-338.
Lewis, G., & Zervas, G. (2016). The Welfare Impact of Consumer Reviews: A Case Study of the
Hotel Industry. Working paper.
Li, J., Netessine, S., & Koulayev, S. (2017). Price to Compete… with Many: How to Identify
Price Competition in High-Dimensional Space. Forthcoming, Management Science.
Liu, Y. (2006). Word of mouth for movies: Its dynamics and impact on box office
revenue. Journal of marketing, 70(3), 74-89.
Lu, Q., Ye, Q., & Law, R. (2014). Moderating effects of product heterogeneity between online
word-of-mouth and hotel sales. Journal of electronic commerce research, 15(1), 1.
Luca, M. (2016). Reviews, reputation, and revenue: The case of Yelp. com. Com (March 15,
2016). Harvard Business School NOM Unit Working Paper, (12-016).
Luca, M., & Smith, J. (2015). Strategic disclosure: The case of business school rankings. Journal
of Economic Behavior & Organization, 112, 17-25.
Levy, F. (1965). Adaptation in the production process. Management Science. 11(6), 136-B154.
Ma, L., Sun, B., & Kekre, S. (2015). The Squeaky Wheel Gets the Grease—An empirical
analysis of customer voice and firm intervention on Twitter. Marketing Science, 34(5), 627-645.
MacLeod, W. B. (2007). Reputations, relationships, and contract enforcement. Journal of
economic literature, 45(3), 595-628.
March, J. G. (2010). The ambiguities of experience. Cornell University Press.
March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1975). The uncertainty of the past: Organizational learning under
ambiguity. European Journal of political research, 3(2), 147-171.
March, J.G., Shapira, Z. (1992). Variable risk preferences and the focus of attention. Psychology
Review, 99, 172-183.
March, J. G., & Simon, H. A. (1958). Organizations, Oxford, England: Wiley.
102

Martins, L. L. (2005). A model of the effects of reputational rankings on organizational
change. Organization Science, 16(6), 701-720.
Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and
ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 83, 340–363.
Mezias, S. J., Chen, Y. R., & Murphy, P. R. (2002). Aspiration-level adaptation in an American
financial services organization: A field study. Management Science, 48(10), 1285-1300.
McNamara, G., & Bromiley, P. (1997). Decision making in an organizational setting: Cognitive
and organizational influences on risk assessment in commercial lending. Academy of
Management journal, 40(5), 1063-1088.
McCann, B. T., & Vroom, G. (2010). Pricing response to entry and agglomeration
effects. Strategic Management Journal, 31(3), 284-305.
McDevitt, R. C. (2014). “A” business by any other name: firm name choice as a signal of firm
quality. Journal of Political Economy, 122(4), 909-944.
Moe, W. W., & Schweidel, D. A. (2012). Online product opinions: Incidence, evaluation, and
evolution. Marketing Science, 31(3), 372-386.
Moliterno, T. P., Beck, N., Beckman, C. M., & Meyer, M. (2014). Knowing your place: social
performance feedback in good times and bad times. Organization Science, 25(6), 1684-1702.
Mukherjee, A. S., Lapré, M. A., & Van Wassenhove, L. N. (1998). Knowledge driven quality
improvement. Management Science, 44(11-part-2), S35-S49.
Nieto-García, M., Muñoz-Gallego, P. A., & González-Benito, Ó. (2017). Tourists’ willingness to
pay for an accommodation: The effect of eWOM and internal reference price. International
Journal of Hospitality Management, 62, 67-77.
Opinion Research Corporation (www.opinionresearch.com). Retrieved from: Miller, R.,
Washington, K. (2014) RKMA Market Research Handbook Series (10th edition). Richard K.
Miller & Associates, Loganville, GA.
Park, S. Y., & Allen, J. P. (2013). Responding to online reviews: Problem solving and
engagement in hotels. Cornell Hospitality Quarterly, 54(1), 64-73.
103

Pavlou, P. A., & Dimoka, A. (2006). The nature and role of feedback text comments in online
marketplaces: Implications for trust building, price premiums, and seller
differentiation. Information Systems Research, 17(4), 392-414.
Peteraf, M., & Shanley, M. (1997). Getting to know you: A theory of strategic group
identity. Strategic Management Journal, 165-186.
Pfeffer, J. (1981). Management as symbolic action: the creation and maintenance of
organizational paradigm. Research in organizational behavior, 3, 1-52.
Pfeffer, J., & Fong, C. T. (2004). The business school ‘business’: Some lessons from the US
experience. Journal of management studies, 41(8), 1501-1520.
Pfarrer, M. D., Decelles, K. A., Smith, K. G., & Taylor, M. S. (2008). After the fall:
Reintegrating the corrupt organization. Academy of Management Review, 33(3), 730-749.
Park, D. H., Lee, J., & Han, I. (2007). The effect of on-line consumer reviews on consumer
purchasing intention: The moderating role of involvement. International Journal of Electronic
Commerce, 11(4), 125-148.
Pennerstorfer, D. (2009). Spatial price competition in retail gasoline markets: evidence from
Austria. The Annals of Regional Science, 43(1), 133-158.
Perloff, J. M., & Salop, S. C. (1986). Firm-specific information, product differentiation, and
industry equilibrium. Oxford Economic Papers, 38, 184-202.
Pinkse, J., Slade, M. E., & Brett, C. (2002). Spatial price competition: a semiparametric
approach. Econometrica, 70(3), 1111-1153.
Pinkse, J., & Slade, M. E. (2004). Mergers, brand competition, and the price of a pint. European
Economic Review, 48(3), 617-643.
Podolny, J. M. (1993). A status-based model of market competition. American journal of
sociology, 98(4), 829-872.
Proserpio, D., & Zervas, G. (2017). Online reputation management: Estimating the impact of
management responses on consumer reviews. Marketing Science, 36(5), 645-665.

104

Radner, R. (1975). A behavioral model of cost reduction. The Bell Journal of Economics, 196215.
Rand, D. G., Fudenberg, D., & Dreber, A. (2015). It's the thought that counts: The role of
intentions in noisy repeated games. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 116, 481499.
Reagans, R., & McEvily, B. (2003). Network structure and knowledge transfer: The effects of
cohesion and range. Administrative Science Quarterly, 48(2), 240-267.
Reed, W. R. (2015). On the practice of lagging variables to avoid simultaneity. Oxford Bulletin
of Economics and Statistics, 77(6), 897-905.
Rendell, L., Boyd, R., Cownden, D., Enquist, M., Eriksson, K., Feldman, M. W., & Laland, K.
N. (2010). Why copy others? Insights from the social learning strategies
tournament. Science, 328(5975), 208-213.
Resnick, P., Zeckhauser, R., Swanson, J., & Lockwood, K. (2006). The value of reputation on
eBay: A controlled experiment. Experimental economics, 9(2), 79-101.
Repenning, N. P., & Sterman, J. D. (2002). Capability traps and self-confirming attribution
errors in the dynamics of process improvement. Administrative Science Quarterly, 47(2), 265295.
Rezvani, E., Assaf, A, Uysal, M., Lee, M (2019). Learning from own and others: The moderating
role of performance aspiration. International Journal of Hospitality Management, 81, 113-119.
Rhee, M., & Kim, T. (2012). After the collapse: A behavioral theory of reputation repair. The
Oxford handbook of corporate reputation, 446-465.
Richards, T. J., Acharya, R. N., & Kagan, A. (2008). Spatial competition and market power in
banking. Journal of Economics and Business, 60(5), 436-454.
Rindova, V. P., & Fombrun, C. J. (1999). Constructing competitive advantage: the role of firm–
constituent interactions. Strategic management journal, 20(8), 691-710.
Rojas, C. (2008). Price competition in US brewing. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 56(1),
1-31.
105

Salop, S. C. (1979). Monopolistic competition with outside goods. The Bell Journal of
Economics, 141-156.
Shapiro, C. (1983). Premiums for high quality products as returns to reputations. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 98(4), 659-679.
Shipilov, A. V., Greve, H. R., & Rowley, T. J. (2010). When do interlocks matter? Institutional
logics and the diffusion of multiple corporate governance practices. Academy of Management
Journal, 53(4), 846-864.
Singh, J. V., House, R. J., & Tucker, D. J. (1986). Organizational change and organizational
mortality. Administrative science quarterly, 587-611.
Slade, M. E. (1986). Conjectures, firm characteristics, and market structure: An empirical
assessment. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 4(4), 347-369.
Smith, J. M. (1988). Evolution and the Theory of Games. In Did Darwin Get It Right? (pp. 202215). Springer, Boston, MA.
Smith, E. B. (2011). Identities as lenses: How organizational identity affects audiences'
evaluation of organizational performance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 56(1), 61-94.
Sorenson, O. (2003). Interdependence and adaptability: organizational learning and the long–
term effect of integration. Management Science, 49(4), 446-463.
Spender, J. C. (1989). Industry recipes. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Spence, A. M. (1974). Market signaling: Informational transfer in hiring and related screening
processes (Vol. 143). Harvard University Press.
Spence, A. M. (1981). The learning curve and competition. The Bell Journal of Economics, 4970.
Starbuck, W. H., & Milliken, F. J. (1988). Executives’ perceptual filters: What they notice and
how they make sense.
Staw, B. M., McKechnie, P. I., & Puffer, S. M. (1983). The justification of organizational
performance. Administrative science quarterly, 582-600.
106

Suchman, M. C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. Academy
of management review, 20(3), 571-610.
Sutton, J. R., Dobbin, F., Meyer, J. W., & Scott, W. R. (1994). The legalization of the
workplace. American Journal of Sociology, 99(4), 944-971.
Talluri, K. T., & van Ryzin, G. J. (2004). The theory and practice of revenue management.
International series in operations research & management science. Kluwer Academic Publishers,
Boston, MA, 2, 14.
TripAdvisor. 2016. Available at https://www.tripadvisor.com/PressCenter-c4-Fact_Sheet.html.
Accessed December 2016.
Toubia, O., & Stephen, A. T. (2013). Intrinsic vs. image-related utility in social media: Why do
people contribute content to twitter?. Marketing Science, 32(3), 368-392.
Tolbert, P. S., & Zucker, L. G. (1983). Institutional sources of change in the formal structure of
organizations: The diffusion of civil service reform, 1880-1935. Administrative science
quarterly, 22-39.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and
biases. science, 185(4157), 1124-1131.
Ursu, R. (2018). The power of rankings: Quantifying the effect of rankings on online consumer
search and purchase decisions. Marketing Science, 37(4), 530-552.
Vera, D., & Crossan, M. (2004). Strategic leadership and organizational learning. Academy of
Management Review, 29(2), 222-240.
Wang, T., Wezel, F. C., & Forgues, B. (2016). Protecting market identity: When and how do
organizations respond to consumers’ devaluations? Academy of Management Journal, 59(1),
135-162.
Wang, Y., & Chaudhry, A. (2018). When and How Managers’ Responses to Online Reviews
Affect Subsequent Reviews. Journal of Marketing Research, 55(2), 163-177.

107

Ward, A. J., Brown, J. A., & Graffin, S. D. (2009). Under the spotlight: institutional investors
and firm responses to the Council of Institutional Investors' Annual Focus List. Strategic
Organization, 7(2), 107-135.
Williamson, O. E., Wachter, M. L., & Harris, J. E. (1975). Understanding the employment
relation: The analysis of idiosyncratic exchange. The Bell Journal of Economics, 250-278.
Wood, J. V. (1989). Theory and research concerning social comparisons of personal
attributes. Psychological Bulletin, 106(2), 231.
Wright, T.P. (1936). Factors Affecting the Cost of Airplanes. Journal of Aeronautical Sciences,
3(4), 122-128.
Wu, F., & Huberman, B. A. (2008, December). How public opinion forms. In International
Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (pp. 334-341). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.
Ye, Q., Law, R., Gu, B. (2009). The impact of online user reviews on hotel room sales.
International Journal of Hospitality Management, 28, 180-182.
Ye, Q., Law, R., Gu, B., and Chen, W. (2011). The influence of user generated content on
traveler behavior: An empirical investigation on the effects of e-word-of-mouth to hotel online
bookings. Computers in Human Behavior, 27, 634-639.
Yu, T., Sengul, M., & Lester, R. H. (2008). Misery loves company: The spread of negative
impacts resulting from an organizational crisis. Academy of Management Review, 33(2), 452472.
Zahra, S. A., & George, G. (2002). Absorptive capacity: A review, reconceptualization, and
extension. Academy of Management Review, 27(2), 185-203.
Zangwill, W. I., & Kantor, P. B. (1998). Toward a theory of continuous improvement and the
learning curve. Management Science, 44(7), 910-920.
Zervas, G., Proserpio, D., & Byers, J. W. (2017). The rise of the sharing economy: Estimating
the impact of Airbnb on the hotel industry. Journal of marketing research, 54(5), 687-705.

108

Zollo, M., & Singh, H. (2004). Deliberate learning in corporate acquisitions: post acquisition
strategies and integration capability in US bank mergers. Strategic Management Journal, 25(13),
1233-1256.
Zollo, M., & Winter, S. G. (2002). Deliberate learning and the evolution of dynamic
capabilities. Organization science, 13(3), 339-351.
Zucker, L. G. (1987). Institutional theories of organization. Annual review of sociology, 13(1),
443-464.

109

